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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a moral hazard problem in finite time with lump–sum and continuous
payments, involving infinitely many Agents with mean field type interactions, hired by one Principal.
By reinterpreting the mean–field game faced by each Agent in terms of a mean field forward backward
stochastic differential equation (FBSDE for short), we are able to rewrite the Principal’s problem as a
control problem of McKean–Vlasov SDEs. We review one general approaches to tackle it, introduced
recently in [1, 43, 44, 45, 46] using dynamic programming and Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB for
short) equations, and mention a second one based on the stochastic Pontryagin maximum principle,
which follows [10]. We solve completely and explicitly the problem in special cases, going beyond the
usual linear–quadratic framework. We finally show in our examples that the optimal contract in the
N−players’ model converges to the mean–field optimal contract when the number of agents goes to
+∞, thus illustrating in our specific setting the general results of [8].
Key words: Moral hazard, mean field games, McKean–Vlasov SDEs, mean field FBSDEs, infinite
dimensional HJB equations.
AMS 2000 subject classifications: Primary: 91A13. Secondary: 93E20, 60H30.
JEL subject classifications: C61, C73, D82, D86, J33.
1 Introduction
To quote Mary Kom1 before the 2012 summer olympic games, "the incentive of a medal at the biggest
sporting arena in the world is what drives me. Before I hang my gloves, I want to win the Olympic medal,
and my performance at London will decide my future in the sport." When it comes to make an effort in
order to achieve a financial, economical, political or personal project, the notion of incentives becomes
fundamental and strongly determines the dynamic of the associated project. Many crucial questions in
finance and economics are, at their heart, a matter of incentives. How can the government motivate
banks and key players in the financial sector to act for the global interest? How can a firm encourage
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the ANR project Pacman, ANR-16-CE05-0027. This project was
started while the three authors were visiting the department of statistics and applied probability at University of California
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customers to consume (if possible responsibly and economically)? How can an employer motivate her
employees to produce more efficiently?
As the above examples make it clear, these questions naturally lead to distinguish between two entities:
a Principal, who is the one proposing to the second entity, the Agent, a contract. The Agent can accept
or reject the proposed contract, for instance if he has outside opportunities, but is then committed to it.
Of course such a contract will in general involve some kind of effort from the Agent, in exchange of which
he receives some sort of compensation, paid by the Principal. The main issue for the Principal is then
that, most of the time, he is has only partial information about the actions of the Agent, and does not
necessarily observe them. This kind of asymmetry of information leads to a situation which is classically
called in the literature "moral hazard". The problem of the Principal is then to design a contract for the
Agent, which maximises his own utility, and which of course is accepted by the Agent. This situation is
then reduced to finding a Stackelberg equilibrium between the Principal and the Agent. More precisely,
one can proceed in two steps to solve these type of problems:
• given a fixed contract, the Principal computes the best reaction effort of the Agent.
• Then, the Principal solves his problem by taking into account the best reaction effort of the Agent and
computes the associated optimal contract.
This so–called contract theory has known a renewed interest since the seminal paper of Holmström and
Milgrom [27], which introduced a convenient method to treat them in a continuous time setting2. It was
then extended notably by Schättler and Sung [50, 51], Sung [52], and of course the well–known papers
of Sannikov [48, 49], using an approach based on the dynamic programming and martingale optimality
principles, two well–known tools for anyone familiar with stochastic control theory3. More recently, this
approach has been revisited by Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi in [16, 15], where the authors propose a
very general approach which not only encompasses, but goes further than the previous literature. They
showed that, under an appropriate formulation of the problem,
• given a fixed contract, the problem of the Agent can always be interpreted in terms of a BSDE when
he controls only the drift , and,
• the Principal’s problem can be rewritten as a standard stochastic control problem with in general two
state variables, namely the output controlled by the Agent, and his continuation utility.
One arguably non–realistic aspect of the above literature is that in practice, one would expect that the
Principal will have to enter in contracts with several Agents, who may have the possibility of interacting
with, or impacting each other. This situation is known in the literature as multi–Agents model. In a one–
period framework, this problem was studied by Holmström [26], Mookherjee [42], Green and Stokey [24],
or Demski and Sappington [19] among others. Extensions to continuous–time models were investigated
by Koo, Shim and Sung [30] and very recently by Élie and Possamaï [23]. In a model with competitiveness
amongst the Agents, assumed to work for a given firm controlled by the Principal, [23] shows that the
general approach initiated by [15] has a counterpart in the N–Agents case as follows
• given fixed contracts for all the Agents, finding a Nash equilibria between them can be reduced to
finding a solution to a multidimensional BSDE with quadratic growth in general, and,
2There was before that an impressive literature on static or discrete–time models, which we will not detail here. The
interested reader can check the references given in the classical books [3, 31]
3There is an alternative approach using the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle to characterise both the optimal
action of the Agent and the optimal contract in terms of fully coupled systems of FBSDEs, initiated by Williams [53], see
the recent monograph by Cvitanić and Zhang [17] for more details.
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• the Principal’s problem can once more be rewritten as a standard stochastic control problem with
in general 2N state variables, namely the outputs controlled by the Agents, and their continuation
utilities.
The main issue here is that unlike with one–dimensional BSDEs, for which there are well established
wellposedness theories, multi–dimensional systems are inherently harder. Hence, existence and uniqueness
of solutions to systems of quadratic BSDEs have been shown to not always hold by Frei and dos Reis, and
and have been subject to in–depth investigations, see for instance Xing and Žitković [54], or Harter and
Richou [25], as well as the references therein. [23] circumvents this problem by imposing wellposedness
as a requirement for the admissibility of the contracts proposed by the Principal. Such a restriction
would seem, a priori, to narrow down the scope of the approach, but the authors show that in general
situations, the optimal contracts obtained are indeed admissible in the above sense.
The current paper can be understood as a continuation of [23], and considers the situation where one lets
the number of Agents contracting with the Principal become very large. In terms of applications, one
could for instance think about how a firm should provide electricity to a large population, how a govern-
ment should encourage firms or people to invest in renewable energy by giving fiscal incentives, how city
planners should regulate a heavy traffic or a crowd of people... The study of a large number of interacting
players is also relevant for the so–called systemic risk theory, which consists in studying financial entities
deeply interconnected and strongly subjected to the states of the others, see e.g. Carmona, Fouque and
Sun [11]. All these questions rely on the celebrated mean field game theory introduced by Lasry and
Lions [32, 33, 34] and independently by Huang, Caines and Malhamé [28, 29]. Mean field games theory
(MFG for short) consists in the modelling of a large set of identical players who have the same objectives
and the same state dynamics. Each of them has very little influence on the overall system and has to
take a decision given a mean field term driven by the others. The problem is then to find an equilibrium
for the studied system. We refer to the notes of Cardaliaguet [7] and to the book of Bensoussan, Frehse
and Yam [2] for nice overviews of this theory. The associated optimal control problems, also coined
mean–field type control problems lie at the very heart of our approach and have only been approached
recently in the literature, see e.g. Carmona and Delarue [10] or Pham and Wei [44, 45, 46].
Let us now describe in further details our problem. We focus our attention on the situation where the
Principal has to hire infinitely many Agents who are supposed to be identical, and who can control
the drift of an output process, representing the project that the Agent has to manage on behalf of the
Principal. The value of this project is affected through his drift by both its law, and the law of the control,
representing both the aggregated impact of the other Agents. We provide a weak formulation of the
mean–field version of this model, inspired by [12] and proceed to show that solving the mean field system
associated with the Agent’s problem is equivalent to solving a kind of mean field BSDE4. Even though
such objects are actually easier to investigate than the aforementioned systems of quadratic BSDEs, it
remains that their wellposedness requires in general very strong assumptions, see [12]. Following in the
footsteps of [23], we therefore embed wellposedness into the definition of an admissible contract. All of
this is proved in Section 3. Once this is done, we are on the right track traced by [15], and turn to the
Principal’s problem in Section 4. The latter can then be shown to be equivalent to solving a (difficult)
mean–field type control problem with the expected two states variables. We believe this result to be our
main technical and practical contribution, since this paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, in the
literature to solve general mean–field Principal–Agent problems5. This opens up the way to considering
extremely rich situations of interactions between many Agents, with subtle ripple effects.
4Several papers have investigated related but not exactly similar BSDEs, see among others [4, 6, 5, 9].
5Let us nonetheless mention the recent contribution of Djehiche and Hegelsson [20] which considers a related but different
problem with only one Agent whose output solves a McKean–Vlasov SDE. Their approach relies on a stochastic maximum
principle.
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We next apply in Section 5 our general results to specific examples. More precisely, we consider an
extension of Holmström and Milgrom [27] to the mean–field case, where the drift of the output process is
a linear function of the effort of the Agent, the output itself, its mean, its variance and the mean of the
effort of the Agent. In particular, we show that the optimal effort is deterministic, by providing a smooth
solution to the HJB equation associated with the Principal’s problem. We then extend this example to
the case where the Principal is no longer risk–neutral, and adopts a mean–variance attitude, in the sense
that his criterion is impacted by both the variance of the output (he does not want projects with volatile
values) and the variance of the salary given to the Agent (he does not want to create discrimination inside
the firm). Our final point concerns the rigorous links between the N−players’ model and the mean–field
limit. Proving the convergence in a general setting is an extremely hard problem, see for instance
the recent article of Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry and Lions [8]. Therefore, we have concentrated our
attention to the above examples, and showed in this context that the optimal contract in the N−Agents’
model, as well as their optimal actions, indeed converged to the mean–field solution.
General notations: Let R be the real line, R+ the non–negative real line and R⋆+ the positive real
line. Let m and n be two positive integers. We denote by Mm,n(R) the set of matrices with m rows
and n columns, and simplify the notations when m = n, by using Mn(R) := Mn,n(R). We denote by
In ∈ Mn(R) the identity matrix of order n. For any M ∈ Mm,n(R), we define M⊤ ∈ Mn,m as the usual
transposition of the matrixM . For any x ∈ Rn, we set diag(x) ∈ Mn(R) such that (diag(M))i,j = 1i=jxi,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We denote by 1n,n the matrix with coefficients (1n,n)i,j = 1 for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . We will
always identify Rn with Mn,1(R). Besides, for any X ∈ Rn, we denote its coordinates by X1, . . . ,Xn.
We denote by ‖·‖n the Euclidian norm on Rn, which we simplify to | · | when N = 1. The associated inner
product between x ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rn is denoted by x ·y. We also denote by 0n and 1n the n−dimensional
vector (0, . . . , 0)⊤ and (1, . . . , 1)⊤ respectively and (ei)1≤i≤N the canonical basis of RN . Similarly, for
any X ∈ Rn, we define for any i = 1, . . . , n, X−i ∈ Rn−1 as the vector X without its ith component,
that is to say X−i := (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)⊤. For any X,Y in RN we will write X ≤ Y for the
classical lexicographic order i.e. X ≤ Y if Xi ≤ Y i, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N . Finally, for any (a, a˜) ∈ R×Rn−1, and
any i = 1, . . . , n, we define the following n−dimensional vector
a⊗i a˜ := (a˜
1, . . . , a˜i−1, a, a˜i, . . . , a˜n−1).
For any Banach space (E, ‖ · ‖E), let f be a map from E × Rn into R. For any x ∈ E, we denote by
∇af(x, a) the gradient of a 7−→ f(x, a), and we denote by ∂aaf(x, a) the Hessian matrix of a 7−→ f(x, a).
When n = 1, we write fa(x, a) for the derivative of f with respect to the variable a.
Finally, we denote by D the set of deterministic function from [0, T ] into R.
2 The mean field problem
This section is dedicated to the description of the mean–field problem studied in this investigation. The
paradigme considered is the following, we consider an entire crowd of Agents hired by one Principal and
we focus on a representative one interacting with the theoretical distribution of the infinite number of
other players.
2.1 Stochastic basis and spaces
In this section we recall some notations used in [12]. Fix a positive integer N and a positive real number
T . For any measurable space (S,FS), we will denote by P(S) the set of probability measures on S. Let
(E, ‖ · ‖E) be a Banach space. We will always refer to the Borel sets of E (associated to the topology
induced by the norm ‖ · ‖E) by B(E). We will also endow this set with the topology induced by the weak
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convergence of probability measures, that is to say that a sequence (mn)n in P(E) converges weakly to
m ∈ P(E) if for any bounded continuous map ϕ : E −→ E, we have
lim
n→+∞
∫
E
ϕ(x)dmn(x) =
∫
E
ϕ(x)dm(x).
This convergence is associated to the classical Wasserstein distance of order p ≥ 1, defined for any µ and
ν in P(E) by
WE,p(µ, ν) =
(
inf
π∈Γ(µ,ν)
∫
E
‖x− y‖pEπ(dx, dy)
) 1
p
,
where Γ(µ, ν) denotes the space of all joint distributions with marginal laws µ and ν. More precisely,
convergence in the Wasserstein distance of order p is equivalent to weak convergence plus convergence of
the first pth moments.
Let C := C([0, T ];R) be the space of continuous maps from [0, T ] into RN , endowed with the norm
‖ω‖T,∞, where for any t ∈ [0, T ], we have defined ‖ω‖t,∞ = sups∈[0,t] ‖ωs‖. We denote Ω := R
N ×C. and
define the coordinate processes in the space Ω by
ψ(x, ω) := x, W (x, ω) := ω, ∀(x, ω) ∈ Ω.
We fix a probability measure λ0 in P(R), which will serve as our initial distribution for the state of the
different Agents of the model. We will always assume that λ0 has exponential moments of any order,
that is to say ∫
RN
exp(px)λ0(dx) <∞, for any p ≥ 0. (2.1)
We denote by P the product of λ0 with the Wiener measure defined on B(C). For any t ∈ [0, T ], we
define Ft as the P−augmentation of the σ−field σ((ψ,Ws)s∈[0,t]), as well as the filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ].
The filtered probability space we will be interested in is (Ω,B(Ω),F,P). Expectations or conditional
expectations under P will be denoted by E[·] and E[·|·].We also denote by T[0,T ] the set of F−stopping
times which take value in [0, T ].
For any finite dimensional normed space (E, ‖·‖E), Proc(E) (resp. Prev(E)) will denote the set of
E−valued, F−adapted processes (resp. F−predictable processes) and for any p ≥ 1 and ℓ > 0
S
p(E) :=
{
Y ∈ Proc(E), càdlàg, such that ‖Y ‖
p
Sp(E) := E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖Yt‖
p
E
]
< +∞
}
,
Sexp(E) :=
{
Y ∈ Proc(E), càdlàg and such that E
[
exp
(
p sup
0≤t≤T
‖Yt‖E
)]
< +∞, ∀p ≥ 1
}
,
H
p(E) :=
{
Z ∈ Prev(E), ‖Z‖
p
Hp
:= E
[(∫ T
0
‖Zt‖
2
Edt
)p/2]
< +∞
}
,
H
ℓ
exp(E) :=
{
Z ∈ Prev(E), E
[
exp
(
m
∫ T
0
‖Zt‖
ℓ
Edt
)]
< +∞, ∀m ≥ 1
}
.
In this paper we will almost always consider E−valued processes X : [0, T ] × C −→ E which will be
F−optional. Notice that such processes are automatically non–anticipative in the sense that for any
(x, x′) ∈ C × C such that for some t ∈ [0, T ], x·∧t = x′·∧t, we have
X(s, x) = X(s, x′), for any s ≤ t.
5
Fix some σ−algebra G on (Ω,B(Ω). For any E−valued and G−measurable random variable F on Ω, we
denote by L(F ) := P ◦ F−1 ∈ P(Ω) the law of F under P and for any p > 0, we set
Lp(Ω,G, E) :=
{
F : Ω −→ E, G−measurable, s.t. E[‖F‖pE ] < +∞
}
.
2.2 Output, controls, drift, volatility, cost and discount factor
The problems that we will consider necessitate to introduce a certain number of maps. We first introduce
a volatility process σ : [0, T ]× C −→ R\{0}. It will be assumed to satisfy the following.
Assumption (σ). The map σ is bounded by some positive constant M , F−optional, and for every
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×C, σ(t, x) is invertible with inverse bounded by some positive constant M . Moreover, σ is
such that the following stochastic differential equation admits a unique strong solution
Xt = ψ +
∫ t
0
σs(X)dWs, t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
Let us define the following set
P(R) := {q : [0, T ] −→ P(R), measurable} .
Our second object will be the so–called drift function, which drives the value of the output. It will be a
map b from [0, T ] × C × P(C) × P(R) × R into R. For any (p, ℓ, η) ∈ [1,+∞) × (0,+∞) × (1,+∞), we
will consider the following assumption on b
Assumption (Bp,ℓ,η). (i) For any (µ, q, a) ∈ P(C) × P(R) × R, the map (t, x) 7−→ b(t, x, µ, q, a) is
F−optional.
(ii) For any (t, x, µ, q) ∈ [0, T ]×C×P(C)×P(R), the map a 7−→ b(t, x, µ, q, a) is continuously differentiable
on R.
(iii) There is a positive constant C such that for any (t, x, µ, q, a) ∈ [0, T ] × C × P(C) × P(R) × R, we
have
|b(t, x, µ, q, a)| ≤ b0(‖x‖t,∞) + C
(
1 +
(∫
C
‖z‖pt,∞µ(dz)
) 1
p
+
(∫
R
|z|pq(dz)
) 1
p
+ |a|ℓ
)
,
|∂ab(t, x, µ, q, a)| ≤ C
(
1 + b1(‖x‖t,∞) +
(∫
C
‖z‖pt,∞µ(dz)
) 1
p
+
(∫
R
|z|pq(dz)
) 1
p
+ |a|ℓ−1
)
,
where b0, b1 : R+ −→ R+ are such that
E
[
exp
(
3η
2
M2
∫ T
0
|b0(‖X‖t,∞)|
2dt
)
+ exp
(
h
∫ T
0
|b1(‖X‖t,∞)|
h′dt
)]
< +∞, ∀h, h′ > 1,
with M denoting the constant defined in Assumption (σ).
Remark 2.1. Letting the drift b depend on the laws of the output and the control allows for instance to
incorporate the following effects.
(i) The law value of the firm can have a positive or negative impact on its future evolution: when things
are going well, they have a tendency to keep doing so, and conversely.
(ii) Similarly, if all the crowd of Agents in the firm are working on average very hard, this could have a
ripple effect on the whole firm. Hence a dependence on the law of the control itself.
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Furthermore, the growth assumptions made here are for tractability, and are mainly due to the fact that
we are going at some point to work with quadratic (of possibly mean field type) BSDEs. They allow for
instance for drifts which are linear in x, with a constant small enough. Indeed, in this case X is basically
like a Brownian motion (recall that σ is bounded) so that its square will have exponential moments,
provided that they are of a small order.
The third object will be a discount factor k, that is a map from [0, T ]×C ×P(C)×P(R) to R, satisfying
the following standing assumption.
Assumption (K). The map k is bounded, and F−optional for any (µ, q) ∈ P(C) ×P(R).
Remark 2.2. The discount factor is here to model a possible impatience of the Agents, who would value
more having utility now than later. Letting it depend on the law of X and the law of the control played
by the Agents is again for generality and possible ripple effects. Agents may for instance become more
impatient if the firm is currently doing extremely well. We could have let k also depend on the control
itself, but it would have further complicated our definition of admissible controls. We therefore decided to
refrain from it, but it is not a limit of the theory, per se.
Finally, we will need to consider a cost function c : [0, T ] × C × P(C) × P(R)× R −→ R+ satisfying, for
some (p, ℓ,m,m) ∈ [1,+∞)× (0,+∞)× [ℓ,+∞)× (ℓ− 1,+∞)
Assumption (Cp,ℓ,m,m). For any (µ, q, a) ∈ P(C) × P(R) × R, the map (t, x) 7−→ c(t, x, µ, q, a) is
F−optional. Moreover, the map a 7−→ c(t, x, µ, q, a) is increasing, strictly convex and continuously dif-
ferentiable for any (t, x, µ, q) ∈ [0, T ] × C × P(C) × P(R). Finally, there exists C > 0 such that for any
(t, x, µ, q, a) ∈ [0, T ]× C × P(C) × P(R)× R
0 ≤ c(s, x, µ, q, a) ≤ C
(
1 + ‖x‖s,∞ +
(∫
C
‖z‖ps,∞µ(dz)
) 1
p
+
(∫
RN
|z|pq(dz)
) 1
p
+ |a|ℓ+m
)
,
|∂ac(s, x, µ, q, a)| ≥ C|a|
m, and lim|a|→∞
c(s, x, µ, q, a)
|a|ℓ
= +∞.
Remark 2.3. Once again, the cost faced by the Agents can be influenced by the past states of the firm
and its law, as well as the law of the control played by the other Agents. It helps to model the fact that
Agents may find it hard to work when everyone else is working (the classical free rider problem), or if
the situation of the firm is on average extremely good. As for the growth conditions assumed, they are
basically here to ensure that the Hamiltonian of the Agent, which will involve both b and c, has at least
one maximiser in a, thanks to nice coercivity properties.
We now turn to the definition of the notion of admissible control. We denote by A the set of R−valued
and F−adapted processes α such that for some ε > 0, for every (h, µ, q) ∈ R+×P(C)×P(R) and for the
same m and ℓ as the ones appearing in Assumption (Cp,ℓ,m,m)
E
[(
E
(∫ T
0
σ−1t (X)b(t,X, µ, qt, αt)dWt
))1+ε]
+ E
[
exp
(
h
∫ T
0
|αt|
ℓ+mdt
)]
< +∞. (2.2)
Then, for any (µ, q, α) ∈ P(C)×P(R)×A, we can define, thanks to Assumption 2.2, a probability Pµ,q,α
such that
dPµ,q,α
dP
= E
(∫ T
0
σ−1t (X)b(t,X, µ, qt, αt)dt
)
. (2.3)
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Hence, we can define a Brownian motion under Pµ,q,α by
W µ,q,αt := Wt −
∫ t
0
σ−1s (X)b(s,X, µ, qs, αs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.,
so that we can rewrite
Xt = ψ +
∫ t
0
b(s,X, µ, qs, αs)ds +
∫ t
0
σs(X)dW
µ,q,α
s , t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
2.3 The Agent’s problem: a classical mean–field game
We consider that a representative Agent has utility functions UA : R −→ R and uA : [0, T ]× C ×P(C)×
P(R)× R+ −→ R. We will assume
Assumption (U). The map UA is non–decreasing and concave, and for any (t, x, µ, q) ∈ [0, T ] × C ×
P(C) × P(R), the map χ 7−→ uA(t, x, µ, q, χ) is non–decreasing and concave. Furthermore, for any
(µ, q, χ) ∈ P(C)×P(RN )×R+, the map (t, x) 7−→ uA(t, x, µ, q, χ) is F−optional, and there is a positive
constant C and a concave map u˜A : R+ −→ R+ such that for any (t, x, µ, q, χ) ∈ [0, T ] × C × P(C) ×
P(RN )×R+, we have
|uA(t, x, µ, q, χ)| ≤ C
(
1 + ‖x‖t,∞ +
(∫
C
‖z‖pt,∞µ(dz)
) 1
p +
(∫
R
|z|pq(dz)
) 1
p
+ u˜A(χ)
)
.
The representative Agent is hired at time 0 by the Principal on a "take it or leave it" basis. The Principal
proposes a contract to the Agent, which consists in two objects.
(i) A stream of payment χ, which is a (R⋆+)−valued and F−adapted process, such that χt represents the
instantaneous payments made to the Agent at time t.
(ii) A final payment ξ, which is a R−valued and FT−measurable random variable which represents the
amount of money received by the Agent at time T .
A contract will always refer to the pair (χ, ξ), and the set of contracts will be denoted by C. For given
(µ, q, α) ∈ P(C) ×P(R)×A, representing respectively an arbitrary distribution of the output managed
by the infinitely many other Agents, an arbitrary distribution of the actions chosen by these infinitely
many Agents, and an action chosen by the representative Agent, his associated utility is given by
vA0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α) := E
P
µ,q,α
[
KX,µ,q0,T UA(ξ) +
∫ T
0
KX,µ,q,α0,s
(
uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs)
)
ds
]
,
where for any (x, µ, q, t, s) ∈ C × P(C) ×P(R)× [0, T ] × [t, T ]
Kx,µ,qt,s := exp
(
−
∫ s
t
k(u, x, µ, qs)du
)
.
In another words, the Agent profits from the (discounted) utilities of his terminal payment, and his
inter–temporal payments, net of his instantaneous cost of working. Overall, the problem of the Agent
corresponds to the following maximisation
V A0 (χ, ξ, µ, q) := sup
α∈A
vA0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α). (2.4)
As usual in mean–field games, it is immediate that the best reaction function of the Agent is a standard
(albeit non–Markovian) stochastic control problem, where µ and q only play the role of parameters. As
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such, it is a well–known result that, since the Agents can only impact the drift of the output process,
the study of the dynamic version of the Agent’s value function requires to introduce first the following
family of BSDEs, indexed by (µ, q, α) ∈ P(C) ×P(R)×A
Y µ,q,αt (χ, ξ) = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
g
(
s,X, Y µ,q,αs (χ, ξ), Z
µ,q,α
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, αs, χs
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zµ,q,αs (χ, ξ)σs(X)dWs,
(2.5)
where for any (s, x, y, z, µ, q, a, χ) ∈ [0, T ]× C ×R× R× P(C) ×P(R)× R× R+ we defined
g(s, x, y, z, µ, qs, a, χ) := zb(s, x, µ, qs, a) + uA(s, x, µ, qs, χ)− k(s, x, µ, qs)y − c(s, x, µ, qs, a). (2.6)
We begin by defining a solution to BSDE (2.5).
Definition 2.1. We say that a pair of processes (Y µ,q,α(χ, ξ), Zµ,q,α(χ, ξ)) solves the BSDE (2.5) if
Y µ,q,α(χ, ξ) ∈ Sexp(R), Z
µ,q,α(χ, ξ) ∈ Hp(R) for any p ≥ 0 and (2.5) holds for any t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
We now make the aforementioned link between vA0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α) and BSDE (2.5) clear with the following
Lemma, whose proof is classical, but which we recall in the Appendix for comprehensiveness.
Lemma 2.1. Let Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η), (σ), (U), (K) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m) be true for some (p, ℓ,m,m, η) ∈
[1,+∞)× (1,+∞)× [ℓ,+∞)× (ℓ− 1,+∞)× (1,+∞). For any (µ, q, α) ∈ P(C)×P(R)×A, there exists
a unique solution (Y µ,q,α(χ, ξ), Zµ,q,α(χ, ξ)) to BSDE (2.5). Moreover, it satisfies
E [Y µ,q,α0 (χ, ξ)] = v
A
0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α).
Now, we turn our attention to the equilibrium between the Agents, which consists in solving the problem
(2.4) and finding an associated fixed point. For given (χ, ξ) ∈ C, we call this problem (MFG)(χ, ξ) and
recall our readers the rigorous definition of a solution, taken from [12].
Definition 2.2 (Solution of (MFG)(χ, ξ)). A triplet (µ, q, α) ∈ P(C) ×P(R) × A is a solution to the
system (MFG)(χ, ξ) if V A0 (χ, ξ, µ, q) = v
A
0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α), P
µ,q,α ◦ (X)−1 = µ and Pµ,q,α ◦ (αt)
−1 = qt for
Lebesgue almost every t ∈ [0, T ].
Recall from Lemma 2.1 that for any triplet (µ, q, α) ∈ P(C) ×P(R) ×A, there exists a unique solution
to BSDE (2.5). The notion of admissibility for an effort given by (2.2) implies implicitly that we have to
restrict a bit more the notion of a solution to (MFG)(χ, ξ), mainly in terms of the required integrability.
Let r > 1 be fixed throughout the rest of the paper. We denote by MFr(χ, ξ) the set of solutions (µ, q, α)
to (MFG)(χ, ξ) such that the second component Zµ,q,α of the solution to BSDE (2.5) (associated to the
solution of (MFG)(χ, ξ) by Lemma 2.1) is in the space Hλrexp(R), with λ := (ℓ +m)/(m + 1 − ℓ) (recall
that by definition, m+ 1 > ℓ).
In general, the system (MFG)(χ, ξ) can admit several solutions, i.e. the set MFr(χ, ξ) is not necessarily
reduced to a unique triplet (µ, q, α). To simplify our study, we will assume that the choice of the
equilibrium played by the Agents is handed over to the Principal, so that she chooses both contracts
and mean–field equilibria. One interpretation is that the Agents are not sophisticated enough to select a
mean–field equilibrium, but are however able to check if the proposed effort is indeed a component of a
mean–field equilibrium.
Remark 2.4. We would also like to emphasise that the Agents could also be allowed to select one equi-
librium in (MFG)(χ, ξ) themselves. This framework is also covered by our study, provided that one
fixes that equilibrium in the rest of the paper. Nevertheless, in view of the literature on Principal–Agent
problems, it is more relevant to assume that the choice is delegated to the Principal, since classically the
Principal offers to the Agent both a contract and a recommended level of effort (see [31] for instance).
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2.4 The Principal problem
Before defining the problem of the Principal, we need to define the set of admissible contracts. The
idea is to consider only contracts such that the Principal is able to compute the reaction of the Agents,
that is to say the ones for which there is at least one mean field equilibrium. Although there could
arguably be a discussion on the question of whether considering that the Agents are looking for a mean
field equilibrium or not is the most pertinent one, we believe that once this choice has been made, our
assumption makes sense from the practical point of view. Indeed, the Principal needs to be able to
anticipate, one way or another, how the Agents are going to react to the contract that he may offer,
and will therefore not offer contract for which Agents cannot agree on an equilibrium. Granted, one
could also resort to approximate equilibria or other related notions, but this paper being the first one in
the literature treating moral hazard problems with mean–field interactions, we have chosen to work in
a setting which remains reasonable and tractable at the same time. This being said, the contract also
has to take into account the fact that a representative Agent has a reservation utility R0 and will never
accept a contract which does not guarantee them at least that amount of utility.
Finally, we need to add some integrability assumptions, which finally leads us to the set of admissible
contracts Ξ defined by the following.
Definition 2.3. The set Ξ is composed by pairs (χ, ξ) ∈ C, such that
(i) MFr(χ, ξ) 6= ∅.
(ii) For any (µ⋆, q⋆, α⋆) ∈ MFr(χ, ξ) we have V A0 (χ, ξ, µ
⋆, q⋆) ≥ R0.
(iii) For any p ≥ 0
E
[
exp
(
p
(
|UA(ξ)|+
∫ T
0
u˜A(χs)ds
))]
<∞. (2.7)
The Principal’s problem is then to solve the following optimisation
UP0 := sup
(χ,ξ)∈Ξ
sup
(µ,q,α)∈MFr(χ,ξ)
E
P
µ,q,α
[
UP
(
XT − ξ −
∫ T
0
χsds
)]
, (2.8)
where UP is an increasing map from R into R. As far as we know, such a problem has never been
considered so far in the literature. It basically boils down to finding a Stackelberg equilibrium between
the Principal and infinitely many Agents in mean–field equilibrium. The main contribution of this paper
is to show that we can actually reduce it to the study of a system of controlled McKean–Vlasov SDEs.
We will describe in Section 4 some approaches to try and tackle the latter problem.
3 Solving the mean–field game: yet another BSDE story
3.1 Optimal effort
We now present a result ensuring the existence of a maximiser for g with respect to the effort of the
Agent, as well as associated growth estimates.
Lemma 3.1. Let Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η), (σ), (K) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m) hold true for some (p, ℓ,m,m, η) ∈
[1,+∞) × (0,+∞) × [ℓ,+∞) × (ℓ − 1,+∞) × (1,+∞). Then, for any (s, x, µ, q, y, z, χ) ∈ [0, T ] × C ×
P(C) ×P(R)×R× R× R+ there exists a
⋆(s, x, z, µ, q) ∈ R such that
a⋆(s, x, z, µ, q) ∈ argmax
a∈A
g(s, x, y, z, µ, qs, a, χ), (3.1)
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satisfying for some positive constant C
|a⋆(t, x, z, µ, q)|
≤ C
(
1 + |z|
1
m+1−ℓ
(
1 + |b1(‖x‖t,∞)|
1
m+1−ℓ +
(∫
C
‖w‖pt,∞µ(dw)
) 1
p(m+1−ℓ)
+
(∫
R
|w|pq(dw)
) 1
p(m+1−ℓ)
))
.
Furthermore, we have
|g(s, x, y, z, µ, qs, a
⋆(s, x, z, µ, q), χ)|
≤ C
(
1 + ‖x‖s,∞ + |y|+ |z|
(ℓ+m)∨(m+1)
m+1−ℓ +
(∫
C
‖w‖pt,∞µ(dw)
) 1
p
+
(∫
R
|w|pq(dw)
) 1
p
+ u˜A(χ)
)
+ C|z|
(
b0(‖x‖t,∞) +
(∫
C
‖w‖pt,∞µ(dw)
) 1
p
+
(∫
R
|w|pq(dw)
) 1
p
)
+ C|z|
m+1
m+1−ℓ
(
|b1(‖x‖t,∞)|
1
m+1−ℓ +
(∫
C
‖w‖pt,∞µ(dw)
) 1
p(m+1−ℓ)
+
(∫
R
|w|pq(dz)
) 1
p(m+1−ℓ)
)
.
In the following, we set
g⋆(s, x, y, z, µ, qs, χ) := sup
a∈A
g(s, x, y, z, µ, qs, aχ).
For the sake of simplicity, we will from now on reduce our study to the case where g only admits one
maximiser, which actually holds in all our examples studied in Section 5, an which basically corresponds
to assuming sufficient coercivity for the Hamiltonian. Our approach extends to the a more general setting
where the Principal can choose among these optimal efforts, albeit with more complicated notations.
Assumption 3.1. For any (t, x, y, z, µ, q, χ) ∈ [0, T ]× C × R× R× P(C) ×P(R)× R+, the map
a ∈ A 7−→ g(t, x, y, z, µ, qs, a, χ),
admits a unique measurable maximiser a⋆(t, x, y, µ, q, χ).
We next consider the following system, which is intimately related to mean–field FBSDE as introduced
by [9].
Y ⋆t (χ, ξ) = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
g⋆(s,X, Y ⋆s (χ, ξ), Z
⋆
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, χs)ds−
∫ T
t
Z⋆s (χ, ξ)σs(X)dWs,
P
µ,q,a⋆(·,X,Z⋆· (χ,ξ),µ,q·) ◦ (X)−1 = µ,
P
µ,q,a⋆(·,X,Z⋆· (χ,ξ),µ,q·) ◦ (a⋆(s,X,Z⋆s (χ, ξ), µ, qs))
−1 = qs, for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ],
(3.2)
where the process a⋆(·,X,Z⋆· (χ, ξ), µ, q·) from Assumption 3.1 satisfies
g⋆(·,X, Y ⋆(χ, ξ), Z⋆(χ, ξ), µ, q, χ) = g(·,X, Y ⋆(χ, ξ), Z⋆(χ, ξ), a⋆(·,X,Z⋆· (χ, ξ), µ, q·), µ, q, χ). (3.3)
Notice that we intrinsically invoke measurable selection arguments (see for instance [22] for detailed ex-
planations) to ensure the measurability of a⋆(·,X,Z⋆· (χ, ξ), µ, q·). This system will provide us the required
probabilistic representation of the solution to the mean–field game of the Agent. Before presenting and
proving this link, we start by defining a solution to (3.2). Once more, the constants ℓ, m and m are the
ones appearing in Assumption (Cp,ℓ,m,m).
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Definition 3.1. A solution to the mean–field BSDE (3.2) is a quadruplet (Y ⋆, Z⋆, µ, q) ∈ Sexp(R) ×
H
λr
exp(R) × P(C) × P(R), with λ = (ℓ +m)/(m + 1 − ℓ), satisfying the system (3.2) for any t ∈ [0, T ],
P− a.s.
Inspired by [23], we aim at providing an equivalence result between a solution to (MFG)(χ, ξ) in the set
MFr(χ, ξ) and a solution to BSDE (3.2) in the sense of Definition 3.1. We have the following theorem
which provides such a result, together with a characterisation of an optimal effort for the Agent in terms
of maximisers of g. Notice that such a link is classical and expected, and was already obtained by
Carmona and Lacker [12], but in a case where the Hamiltonian is Lipschitz and thus does not cover our
setting.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η), (σ), (K) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m) hold true for some (p, ℓ,m,m, η) ∈
[1,+∞)× (0,+∞) × [ℓ,+∞)× (ℓ− 1,+∞)× [0,+∞) × (1,+∞). Fix (χ, ξ) ∈ C.
• Assume that (χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ, i.e., the system (MFG)(χ, ξ) admits a solution in MFr(χ, ξ) denoted by
(µ, q, α⋆). Then there exists a solution (Y ⋆, Z⋆, µ, q) to BSDE (3.2) such that α⋆t = a
⋆(t,X,Z⋆, µ, q, χ)
almost surely. In this case, we have the following decomposition for UA(ξ)
UA(ξ) = Y
⋆
0 −
∫ T
0
g⋆(t,X, Y ⋆t , Z
⋆
t , µ, qt, χt)dt+
∫ T
0
Z⋆t σt(X)dWt. (3.4)
• Conversely, if there exists a solution to BSDE (3.2) denoted by (Y ⋆(χ, ξ), Z⋆(χ, ξ), µ, q) ∈ Sexp(R) ×
H
λr
exp(R)×P(C)×P(R), then the system (MFG)(χ, ξ) admits as a solution in MF
r(χ, ξ), given by the
triplet (µ, q, a⋆(·,X,Z⋆· (χ, ξ), µ, q·)), where a
⋆ is characterized by (3.3).
3.2 A convenient characterisation of Ξ
In order to provide a relevant Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation to solve the Principal’s problem (5.2),
and following the general approach to contracting problems initiated by Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi
[16, 15], we need to have a convenient probabilistic representation of the value function of the Agent,
for any contract (χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ. We will now show in this section that Theorem 3.1 is tailor–made for that
purpose.
Let us start by introducing a convenient notation, and define the set X as the set of R+−valued
F−predictable processes χ such that
E
[
exp
(
h
∫ T
0
u˜A(χs)ds
)]
< +∞, for any h ≥ 0.
Our first step is to introduce an appropriate system of coupled and controlled McKean–Vlasov type SDEs,
which basically amounts to look at the BSDE (3.2) in a forward manner. For any (Y0, Z) ∈ R×Hλrexp(R),
with once more λ = (ℓ+m)/(m+ 1− ℓ), and any χ ∈ X , we introduce for a⋆ given by Assumption 3.1.
Xt = ψ +
∫ t
0
b(s,X, µ, qs, a
⋆(s,X,Zs, µ, qs))ds+
∫ t
0
σs(X)dW
µ,q,a⋆(·,X,Z·,µ,q·)
s ,
Y Y0,Zt (χ) = Y0 +
∫ t
0
(
b(s,X, µ, qs, a
⋆(s,X,Zs, µ, qs))Zs − g
⋆(s,X, Y Y0,Zs (χ), Zs, µ, qs, χs)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
Zsσs(X)dW
µ,q,a⋆(·,X,Z·,µ,q·)
s ,
µ = Pµ,q,a
⋆(·,X,Z·,µ,q·) ◦X−1,
qt = P
µ,q,a⋆(·,X,Z·,µ,q·) ◦ (a⋆(t,X,Zt, µ, qt))
−1, for Lebesgue a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
(3.5)
A solution of this system will be required to satisfy the following properties.
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Definition 3.2. A solution of the system (3.5) is a quadruplet (X,Y Y0,Z(χ), µ, q) satisfying (3.5) for any
t ∈ [0, T ], P − a.s., such that in addition Y Y0,Z(χ) ∈ Sexp(R). We call Z(χ) the subset of Z ∈ H
λr
exp(R),
with λ = (ℓ+m)/(m+ 1− ℓ), such that there is a solution to (3.5) for this given Z.
We now define Ξ̂ as follows
Ξ̂ :=
{(
χ,U
(−1)
A
(
Y Y0,ZT (χ)
))
, χ ∈ X , Y0 ≥ R0, Z ∈ Z(χ)
}
.
We have the following characterisation of the set Ξ as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Let Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η), (σ), (K) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m) hold true for some (p, ℓ,m,m, η) ∈
[1,+∞)× (0,+∞) × [ℓ,+∞)× (ℓ− 1,+∞)× (1,+∞). Then Ξ = Ξ̂.
4 The Principal’s problem: optimal control of a McKean-Vlasov SDE
This section is devoted to the proof of our main result, that is to say that the problem of the Principal
amounts to solving a so–called mean–field type control problem.
4.1 Rewriting the Principal’s problem
Using the characterisation of Ξ provided by Corollary 3.1, we have immediately
UP0 = sup
(χ,ξ)∈Ξ
sup
(µ,q,α)∈MFr(χ,ξ)
E
[
UP
(
XT − ξ −
∫ T
0
χsds
)]
= sup
Y0≥R0
UP0 (Y0),
where
UP0 (Y0) := sup
(χ,Z)∈X×Z(χ)
sup
(µ,q,α)∈MFr
(
χ,U
(−1)
A
(
Y
Y0,Z
T
)) EPµ,q,α[(XT − U−1A (Y Y0,ZT )− ∫ T
0
χsds
)]
.
Hence, for any Y0 ≥ R0, we can identify UP0 (Y0) as the value function of a stochastic optimal control
problem with a two–dimensional state variable Mχ,Z := (X,Y Y0,Z(χ))⊤ controlled by the processes
(χ,Z) ∈ X ×Z(χ). Introducing the following two functions, depending on the map a⋆ from Assumption
3.1
• C : [0, T ]×C2×P(C2)×P(R)×R×R+ −→ R
2 defined for any (t,m, µ, q, z, χ) ∈ [0, T ]×C2×P(C2)×
P(R)× R× R+ by
C(t,m, µ, q, z, χ) :=
(
b(t,m1, µ1, q, a⋆(t,m1, z, µ1, q))
k(t,m1, µ1, q)m2(t) + c(t,m1, µ1, q, a⋆(t,m1, z, µ1, q))− uA(t,m
1, µ1, q, χ)
)
.
• S : [0, T ] × C2 × R −→M2(R) defined for any (t,m, z) ∈ [0, T ]× C2 × R by
S(t,m, z) :=
(
σt(m
1) 0
σt(m
1)z 0
)
,
13
the dynamics of Mχ,Z is then given by6
Mχ,Zt =
(
ψ
Y0
)
+
∫ t
0
C(s,Mχ,Z , µ, qs, Zs, χs)ds+
∫ t
0
S(s,Mχ,Z , Zs)12dW
a⋆(M1,Z,µ1,q)
s ,
µ = Pa
⋆(M1,Z,µ1,q) ◦
(
Mχ,Z
)−1
,
qt = P
a⋆(M1,Z,µ1,q) ◦
(
a⋆(t,M1, Zt, µ
1, qt)
)−1
, for Lebesgue a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.1)
Introducing finally the map G : R2 −→ R, such that for any m ∈ R2, G(m) := m1 − U−1A (m
2), the
problem of the Principal can finally be linked to
UP0 (Y0) = sup
(χ,Z)∈X×Z(χ)
sup
(µ,q,α)∈MFr
(
χ,U
(−1)
A
(
Y
Y0,Z
T
)) EPµ,q,α[UP(G(Mχ,ZT )− ∫ T
0
χsds
)]
, (4.2)
Remark 4.1. Notice that the dynamics of M does not involve the second marginal of µ. We nonetheless
used this notation to stay within the framework of [44] or [10].
Solving such a problem in full generality goes far beyond the scope of the present paper, and this question
is actually the subject of a great number of current studies. Once again, our main message here is that the
a priori quite complicated problem faced by the Principal, consisting in finding a Stackelberg equilibrium
between himself and a mean–field equilibrium of interacting Agents, is actually amenable to a dynamic
programming approach, and leads to a simpler problem of mean–field type control.
In the subsequent section, we will describe informally one possible approache to solve the problem of the
Principal which has been proposed in the literature, before providing several explicitly solvable examples
in Section 5.
4.2 An approach using the dynamic programming principle in the Markovian case
The approach that we present here (but not the first chronologically) to solve (4.2) is mainly based on
the recent papers [1, 43, 44, 45, 46] (see the references therein for earlier results) and consists in using
the dynamic programming principle and solving the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation
in an infinite dimensional space. Of course, this requires to work in a Markovian framework, namely
that, abusing notations slightly, for any (t, x, µ, q, a) ∈ [0, T ]× C × P(C) ×P(R)× R+
b(t, x, µ, q, a) = b(t, x(t), µt, q, a), c(t, x, µ, q, a) = c(t, x(t), µt, q, a), k(t, x, µ, q) = k(t, x(t), µt, q),
where for any (t, µ) ∈ [0, T ]× P(C), we define µ(t) ∈ P(R) by
µt[A] := µ [{ω ∈ Ω, ω(t) ∈ A}] , for every A ∈ B(R).
In order to give a precise meaning to the notion of differentiability in this framework, we follow [44,
Section 4.2], which is based on the original ideas of Lions [39] (see also the lecture notes of Cardaliaguet
[7]), and introduce the differentiability with respect to a probability measure, based on a lifting procedure.
Let n be a positive integer and let u : P(Rn) −→ R. We define u˜ : L2(Ω,FT ,Rn) −→ R by u˜(η) := u(L(η))
for any η ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Rn). We then say that u is differentiable on P(Rn) if u˜ is Fréchet differentiable on
6In full generality, we should have let the initial value of Y be a probability measure as well. However, since the law of
Y never appears in the problem, we fixed it as a constant for simplicity. Notice that in the examples below, we will modify
the criterion of the Principal and let the law of Y play a role. This would necessitate to rewrite the current section, which
we refrain from doing for ease of notations.
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L2(Ω,FT ,R
n) and we denote by [Du˜](η) its Fréchet derivative in the direction of η, which can be identified
as a linear operator from L2(Ω,FT ,Rn) into R. According to Riesz’s Theorem, for any η ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Rn)
there exists Du˜(η) ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Rn) such that for any Y ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Rn)
[Du˜](η)(Y ) = E[Du˜(η) · Y ].
We then introduce the notation ∂ρu(L(η)) : Rn −→ Rn as follows, Du˜(η) =: ∂ρu(L(η))(η), and call the
latter the derivative of u at ρ = L(η). We now say that u is partially twice differentiable on P(Rn) if
u is differentiable in the above sense, and such that the mapping (ρ, x) ∈ P(Rn) × Rn 7−→ ∂ρu(ρ)(x)
is continuous at any point (ρ, x), with x being in the support of ρ, and if for any ρ ∈ P(Rn), the map
x ∈ Rn 7−→ ∂ρu(ρ)(x) is differentiable. We denote the gradient of ∂ρu(ρ)(x) by ∂x∂ρu(ρ)(x) ∈ Rn × Rn.
We also recall that a generalised Ito¯’s formula has been proved by Chassagneux, Crisan and Delarue [13],
for functions from P(Rn) into R. We will need to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether
C depends on the variable q or not.
4.2.1 No dependance on the law of the controls
In this section, we assume that the drift b, the cost function c and the discount factor k do not depend
on the variable q, which means that the drift of the Agent’s output is only impacted by the actions of
the other players through their outputs, and not their actions. This is the situation considered in [46],
from which we deduce that the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation associated with the McKean–Vlasov
optimal control problem (4.2) is
−∂tv(t, ρ) − sup
(χ,z)∈R+×R
H(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρ, z, χ) = 0, (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T )× P(R
2),
v(T, ρ) =
∫
R2
UP (G(x)) ρ(dx), ρ ∈ P(R
2),
(4.3)
with
H(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv, z, χ) :=
∫
R2
L
χ,zv(t, ρ)(x)ρ(dx)
and where for any ϕ : [0, T ]×P(R2) −→ R, which is continuously differentiable in t and twice continuously
differentiable in ρ, for any (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T ] × P(R2), (χ, z) ∈ R+ × R), the map Lχ,zϕ(t, ρ) is defined from
R
2 into R by
L
χ,zϕ(t, ρ)(x) := ∂ρϕ(t, ρ) · C(t, x, ρ, z, χ) +
1
2
Tr
[
∂x∂ρϕ(t, ρ)(x)SS
⊤(t, x, z)
]
− χ, x ∈ R2.
Since in Section 5 we will focus on examples fitting with the framework of Section 4.2.2 below, the proof
of the following verification result to solve (4.2) is omitted. It is however a classical result of stochastic
control theory on the space of measure, and we refer to Theorem 4.2 in the section below for a version
in a more general framework, but with a more restrictive class of controls.
Theorem 4.1. Let v be a continuous map from [0, T ] × P2(R
2) into R such that v(t, ·) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable on P2(R
2) and such that v(·, µ) is continuously differentiable on [0, T ]. Sup-
pose that v is solution to (4.3) such that the supremum is attained for some optimizers of H de-
noted by χ⋆(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv) and Z
⋆(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv) for any (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T ] × P2(R
2) such that (t, ρ) 7−→
χ⋆(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv), Z
⋆(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv) are measurable.
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Let M0 be a square random variable R
2 valued with law µ0 ∈ P2(R
2) and assume moreover that the
following McKean–Vlasov SDE
Mχ
⋆,Z⋆
t =
(
ψ
Y0
)
+
∫ t
0
C(s,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆, µ, Z⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv), χ
⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv))ds
+
∫ t
0
S(s,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆ , Z⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv))12dW
a⋆(M1,Z,µ1)
s ,
µ = Pa
⋆(M1,Z⋆,µ1) ◦
(
Mχ
⋆,Z⋆
)−1
(4.4)
admits a solution Mχ
⋆,Z⋆. Then if the pair of control (Z⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv), χ
⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv)) is in
X × Z(χ), we have
v(0, µ0) = U0(Y0),
and (χ⋆(·, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv), Z
⋆(·, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv)) are optimal in the problem of the Principal (4.2).
Remark 4.2. The function v solution to PDE (4.3) has to be seen as the continuation utility of the
Principal. The proof of this theorem requires only to consider v at time t = 0, but more generally, a
dynamic version of it is of course available in the spirit of [46] for instance.
4.2.2 Dependance on the law of the controls
We now turn to the case where the dependance with respect to the law q impacts the drift b, the cost
function c and the discount factor k. This situation was recently studied in [44], and requires some
modifications compared to the previous case.
Let p ≥ 1 and let Lipp([0, T ] × R × P(R);R) be the set of deterministic measurable functions Z˜ :
[0, T ] × R × P(R) −→ R, such that for any t ∈ [0, T ], the map (x, µ) 7−→ Z˜(t, x, µ) is such that there
exists a constant C > 0 satisfying for any (t, x, x′, µ, µ′) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 × R2 × P(R2)× P(R2)
|Z˜(t, x, µ) − Z˜(t, x′, µ′)| ≤ C
(
‖x− x′‖+WR2,p(µ, µ
′)
)
, and
∫ T
0
Z˜(t,02, δ02)dt < +∞.
We now restrict our attention to control processes (χ,Z) ∈ X × Z(χ) which are actually (partially)
Markovian, in the sense that there is a map Z˜ : [0, T ] × R2 × P(R2) in Lipp([0, T ] × R × P(R);R) for
some p ≥ 1, such that
Zt = Z˜
(
t,Mχ,Z˜t ,L(M
χ,Z˜
t )
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
and such that SDE (4.1) admits a solution Mχ,Z . We denote by Z˜p the set of such processes. The main
difference with Section 4.2.1 lies in the HJB equation associated with the Principal’s problem (4.2) which
becomes 
−∂tv(t, ρ)− sup
(χ,z˜)∈R+×Lip(R2;R)
H˜(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρ, z˜, χ) = 0, (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T ) × P(R
2),
v(T, ρ) = UP
(∫
R2
G(x)ρ(dx)
)
, ρ ∈ P(R2),
(4.5)
where Lip(R2;R) denotes the set of Lipschitz function from R into R with
H˜(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρ, z˜, χ) :=
∫
R2
L˜
χ,z˜v(t, ρ)ρ(dx)
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and where for any ϕ : [0, T ]×P(R2) −→ R, which is continuously differentiable in t and twice continuously
differentiable in ρ, for any (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T ]×P(R2), (χ, z˜) ∈ R+×Lip(R2;R), the map L˜χ,z˜ϕ(t, ρ) is defined
from R2 into R by
L˜
χ,z˜ϕ(t, ρ)(x) := ∂ρϕ(t, ρ) · C(t, x, ρ, qt, z˜(x), χ) +
1
2
Tr
[
∂x∂ρϕ(t, ρ)(x)SS
⊤(t, x, z˜(x))
]
− χ, x ∈ R2.
We thus have the following verification result to solve the problem (4.2)
Theorem 4.2. Let v be a continuous map from [0, T ]×P2(R
2) into R such that v(t, ·) is twice continuously
differentiable on P2(R
2) and such that v(·, µ) is continuously differentiable on [0, T ]. Suppose that v is so-
lution to (4.3) such that the supremum is attained for some optimizers of H˜ denoted by χ⋆(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv)
and Z˜⋆(t, ·, ρ) ∈ Lip(R2;R) for any (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T ]×P2(R
2) such that (t, ρ) 7−→ χ⋆(t, ρ, ∂ρv, ∂x∂ρv) is mea-
surable and (t, x, ρ) 7−→ Z˜⋆(t, x, ρ) is in Lipp([0, T ]× R× P(R);R) for some p ≥ 1.
Let M0 be a square random variable R
2 valued with law µ0 ∈ P2(R
2) and assume moreover that the
following McKean-Vlasov SDE
Mχ
⋆,Z⋆
t =
(
ψ
Y0
)
+
∫ t
0
C(s,Mχ
⋆,Z˜⋆, µ, Z˜⋆(s,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆
s , µ), χ
⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv))ds
+
∫ t
0
S(s,Mχ
⋆,Z˜⋆, Z˜⋆(s,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆
s , µ))12dW
a⋆(M1,Z˜⋆,µ1)
s ,
µ = Pa
⋆(M1,Z˜⋆(·,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆ ,µ),µ1) ◦
(
Mχ
⋆,Z˜⋆
)−1
,
qt = P
a⋆(M1,Z˜⋆,µ1,q) ◦
(
a⋆(t,M1, Z˜⋆(·,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆, µ), µ1, qt)
)−1
, for Lebesgue a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.6)
admits a solution Mχ
⋆,Z⋆. Then if the pair of control
(
χ⋆(s, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv), Z˜
⋆(·,Mχ
⋆,Z⋆ , µ)
)
is in X ×
Z(χ), we have
v(0, µ0) = U0(Y0),
and (χ⋆(·, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv), Z
⋆(·, µ, ∂µv, ∂x∂µv)) are optimal in the problem of the Principal (4.2).
Proof. Let (χ,Z) be any control in Z˜p with associated Z˜ ∈ Lipp([0, T ]×R×P(R);R). We fix a random
variable M0 together with its law µ0. Let Mχ,Z be a solution to the McKean–Vlasov SDE (4.1) with
initial condition (M0, µ0). For this control (χ,Z), we fix some triplet (µ, qt, α) in MFr
(
χ,U
(−1)
A
(
Y Y0,ZT
))
.
According to Ito¯’s formula on the space of measures (see for instance [13]), we have classically
v(T, µ) = v(0, µ0) +
∫ T
0
(
∂tv(s, µ) +
∫
R
L˜
χ,Z˜
t v(s, µ)(x)ν(dx)
)
ds
≤ v(0, µ0) +
∫ T
0
(
∂tv(s, µ) +
∫
R
sup
(χ,z˜)∈R+×Lip(R2;R)
L˜
χ,z˜
t v(s, µ)(x)ν(dx)
)
ds ≤ v(0, µ0).
Then, we deduce that
v(0, µ0) ≥ v(T, µ) = E
Pµ,q,a
⋆
[(
XT − U
−1
A (Y
Y0,Z
T )−
∫ T
0
χsds
)]
.
Thus,
v(0, µ0) ≥ sup
(χ,Z)∈Z˜p
sup
(µ,q,α)∈MFr
(
χ,U
(−1)
A
(
Y
Y0,Z
T
))EPµ,α[(XT − U−1A (Y Y0,ZT )− ∫ T
0
χsds
)]
.
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Let now (χ⋆, Z⋆) optimizer of the Hamiltonian H˜ with associated measures (µ, qt) ∈ P2(R2) × P(R)
such that (4.6) admits a solution. Then, all the inequalities above becomes equalities which provides the
result.
In the example studied in Section 5, we will provide an intuitive optimal contract such that the cor-
responding value function of the Principal is smooth and solves directly PDE (4.3). Combined with a
verification theorem (see for instance Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in [44] or Theorem 4.1 above), this ensures
that we have indeed solved the Principal’s problem. Notice however that in general, one should not
expect existence of classical solutions to the above PDE, and one would have to rely on an appropriately
defined notion of viscosity solutions. We refer the reader to [46] for one possible approach.
4.2.3 On the admissibility of the optimal contract.
This short section adresses the problem of admissibility of the optimal contracts derived from the dynamic
programming approach we just described. Assume that the HJB equation (4.5) admits7 a solution, and
denote by (χ⋆, Z⋆) the optimisers of the Hamiltonian. Recall that a contract (χ, ξ) is admissible, i.e.
(χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ if it is in C and if (MFG)(χ, ξ) has a solution in MFIr(χ, ξ). According to Corollary 3.1, the
admissibility of ξ, and so the existence of a mean–field equilibrium, relies on the existence of a solution
in the sense of Definition (3.2), of the system (3.5). As explained in [12, Remark 7.3], the main difficulty
is that the process Z⋆ can depend on the law of X and the existence of a solution to the system (3.5) is
not clear. However, if for instance the process Z⋆ is deterministic and belongs to the space Lλr([0, T ]),
then the system (3.5) will much more easily admit a solution in the sense of Definition 3.2 since the only
dependence on X and its law will then come from b and σ, and the system also decouples. If existence
can be proved, we get as a consequence of Corollary 3.1, that the contract ξ⋆ = U (−1)A
(
Y R0,Z
⋆
T (χ
⋆)
)
is
optimal. This will be exactly the situation encountered in our solvable examples, so that admissibility
will come almost for free in these cases, using notably the results from [14, 41].
Remark 4.3. Although we will apply the results developed in [1, 43, 44, 45, 46] in the examples studied
in Section 5, we also would like to mention a second approach to deal with the Principal problem (4.2)
based on [10], consisting in applying the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle, and then study the
associated system of fully–coupled FBSDEs.
5 Some explicitly solvable examples
In this section, we study an explicit model where the dynamic of the output process depends on its mean
and its variance. We fix some p ≥ 1 associated to the definition of the space Z˜p.
5.1 Quadratic dynamics and power cost
Let α ∈ [0, 12) and β1, β2, γ ≥ 0. We define for any (s, x, µ, q, a) ∈ [0, T ]× R× P(C) ×P(R)× R+,
b(s, x, µ, q, a) := a+ αx+ β1
∫
R
zdµs(z) + β2
∫
R
zdqs(z)− γVµ(s),
Vµ(s) :=
∫
R
|z|2dµs(z)−
∣∣∣∣∫
R
zdµs(z)
∣∣∣∣2 , and for fixed n > 1, c(s, x, µ, q, a) := c |a|nn , c > 0.
7We have to make clear the definition of a solution to an HJB equation. Most of the time, we have to deal with solutions
in the sense of viscosity for PDEs on Hilbert spaces, introduced by Lions in [36, 38, 37], but in the example studied in
Section 5, we will see that the HJB equation under interest will admits a smooth solution.
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Recalling the definitions of ℓ,m,m, we check immediately that Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m) hold
with ℓ = 1, m = m = n− 1.
In this model, we have a ripple effect in the sense that both the value of the project managed by the
representative, and the average values of the projects managed by the other, impact linearly through the
parameter β1 the drift of X. The better the situation is (that it the further away from 0 X and his mean
are), the better it will be, and conversely if things start to go wrong. Similarly, we assume that large
disparities between the values of the projects have a negative impact on the future evolution of the value
of the firm, through the variance penalisation parameter β2. We interpret this as an indicator of possible
frailness and potential instability of the firm, that should be avoided.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in this applicative section that uA = 0 (the Agent only receives
a terminal payment ξ), k = 0 (no discount factor), UA(x) = x, x ∈ R (the Agent is risk neutral). To
alleviate notations, we omit the dependence with respect to χ in every objects previously defined and we
denote κ := α+ β1.
We also assume that the Principal is risk neutral, which can be at least informally justified by appealing
to propagation of chaos arguments. Formally, we considers a N−players model with exponential utility
for the Principal and we assume furthermore8 that the Principal assignes projects to the Agents so that
each individual output process is scaled by the total number of Agents N to ensure stability as N grows
of the cumulative output. The problem of the Principal thus writes
UP,N0 := sup
(χ,ξ)∈ΞN
E
P
α
N
[
− exp
(
−
RP
N
(
XT − ξ −
∫ T
0
χsds
)
· 1N
)]
, (5.1)
where ΞN is the set of contracts proposed to the N Agents satisfying technical conditions (see [23, 40]
for further details). By taking the limit when N −→∞ in the Principal’s problem (5.1), that we expect
the Principal to become risk–neutral. In other words, the mean–field version of (5.1) for the Principal is
UP0 := sup
(χ,ξ)∈Ξ
sup
(µ,q,α)∈MFr(χ,ξ)
E
Pµ,q,α
[
XT − ξ −
∫ T
0
χsds
]
. (5.2)
Another interpretation9 of the risk-neutrality of the Principal is that it is due to the fact that we expect
the random average penalised output in the N -players’ game to converge to a deterministic quantity,
equal to the expectation of the penalised output of a representative agent, as N goes to infinity. Thus,
the quantity inside the utility of the Principal becomes deterministic, and he simply needs to maximise
this deterministic quantity.
Notice that this example that we consider does not fall into the class of so–called linear–quadratic
problems, which are, as far as we know, the only explicitly solved ones in the mean–field game literature.
Indeed, the drift of the the diffusion X in our case is quadratic, due to the variance penalisation, while
the cost of effort is a power function with any exponent n > 1.
5.1.1 Agent’s optimal effort
Recall now the BSDE associated to the Agent value function UAt (ξ, µ, q) is given by
Y µ,qt (ξ) = ξ +
∫ T
t
g⋆
(
s,X,Zµ,qs (ξ), µ, qs
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zµ,qs (ξ)σdWs,
8We would like to thank one of the referee who has suggested this interpretation of the factor 1
N
in (5.1).
9We thank a referee for proposing this explanation to us.
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where in this context we can compute that
g⋆
(
s, x, z, µ, qs
)
=
|z|
n
n−1
c
1
n−1
(
1−
1
n
)
+ z
(
αx+ β1
∫
R
zdµs(z) + β2
∫
R
zdqs(z)− γVµ(s)
)
.
Let a⋆(Zµ,q) be the corresponding optimiser, i.e.
a⋆s(Z
µ,q) :=
(
|Zµ,qs |
c
) 1
n−1
.
Thus, according to Theorem 3.1, as soon as the corresponding system (3.2) has a solution denoted by
(Y ⋆, Z⋆, µ⋆, q⋆), (µ⋆, q⋆, a⋆s) is solution to (MFG)(ξ) and a
⋆
s := a
⋆
s(Z
⋆) is optimal for the Agent.
5.1.2 Principal’s problem
Recall from Section 4.2.2 that the HJB equation associated with the Principal’s problem is
−∂tv(t, ρ)− sup
(χ,Z)∈X×Z˜p
(∫
R2
L
χ,Zv(t, ρ)ρ(dx)
)
= 0, (t, ρ) ∈ [0, T ) × P(R2),
v(T, ρ) =
∫
R2
G(x)ρ(dx), ρ ∈ P(R2).
(5.3)
In our particular case, we can solve explicitly HJB equation (5.3) and using a verification result we can
solve completely the problem of the Principal (4.2). This lead us to our main result
Theorem 5.1. The optimal contract for the problem of the Principal is
ξ⋆ := δ + β1(1 + β2)
∫ T
0
e(α+β1)(T−t)Xtdt+ (1 + β2)
(
XT − e
(α+β1)TX0
)
for some constant δ explicitly given by (A.7) in the proof. Besides, the contract ξ∗ is a Normal random
variable and
ξ∗ ∼ N
(
R0 +
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
nc
(
e
n
n−1
(α+β1)(T ) − 1
)
; σ2(1 + β2)2
(
e2(α+β1)T − 1
))
.
The associated optimal effort of the Agent is deterministic and given by
a⋆u := (1 + β2)
1
n−1
(
e(α+β1)(T−u)
c
) 1
n−1
, u ∈ [0, T ],
and the value function of the Principal (at least when α > 0 and α 6= β!, see the proof for the other cases)
is
v(t, ν) =
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
κc
1
n−1
(
1−
1
n
)2 (
eκ
n
n−1
(T−t) − 1
)
+
∫
R
xν1(dx)eκ(T−t) −
∫
R
xν2(dx)
−
γ
2α− κ
(
e2α(T−t) − eκ(T−t)
)(∫
R
|x|2ν(dx)−
(∫
R
xν(dx)
)2
+
σ2
2α
)
−
γσ2
2ακ
(
1− eκ(T−t)
)
.
Sketch of the proof . We provide here the main step of the proof and we refer to the Appendix for the
details.
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• In a preliminary step, we provide an empirical investigation of the Principal problem by restricting
our study to deterministic control z. The intuition for this restriction is that the classical model
of Holmström and Milgrom leads to a deterministic z. More precisely, we compute explicitly the
optimal continuation utility of the Principal at any time t given a measure ν, when he is restricted
to choose a deterministic z, since this is a simple exercise of analysis. We denote the corresponding
value by UP (t, ν), and use it as our Ansatz.
• In the first step, we prove that UP is a smooth solution to the associated PDE (5.3) in our particular
example.
• In a second step, we use the verification result given by Theorem 4.2 to prove that UP is indeed
the value function of the Principal problem without any restriction, so that the Ansatz holds.
• In the last step, we compute the optimal contract and we verify the admissibility of the revealed
optimal control.
5.1.3 Economic interpretations
We focus in this section on the impact of different parameters of the model on the designed contract,
the optimal effort of the Agent and the value function of the Principal. Since the optimal effort is
deterministic, X and ξ⋆ are Gaussian, and we only need to study their expectation and variance. The
salary ξ⋆ always decomposes into a fixed part denoted δ and a (possibly negative) variable part, indexed
on the output process X. The one by one sensitivities to the different parameters of the model are
summed up in the next tabular.
c α β1 β2 γ
β1
α+β1
β2
1+β2
Expectation of ξ∗ ց ր ր ր = = =
Variance of ξ∗ = ր ր ր = = =
Fixed salary part δ ց ց ց ց ր ց =
Optimal effort of the Agent ց ր ր ր = = =
Expected gain of the Principal ց ր ր ր ց ր =
Variance of the terminal gain of the Principal = = ր ր = = =
The sensitivities of the fixed salary part and the expected gain of the Principal with respect to a parameter,
are computed when the other parameters are equal to 0. The last two columns of the tabular have to be
understood as follows: the parameters α and β1 are both playing the roles of boosters of the health of
the project, and we present in the last column the impact of parameter β1 whenever α+ β1 is constant.
This boils down to understanding the effect of balancing the boosting effect in the dynamics between the
value of the project X, and the average value of the projects of the company. Similarly, the last column
studies the consequences of partly replacing the effect of effort a⋆ by the average amount of effort E⋆[a⋆]
produced in the company.
Let us now detail further the economic interpretation of the impact of these parameters, by focusing on
the optimal effort of the Agent, the shape of the optimal contract, and the value of the game for the
Principal.
Optimal effort of the Agent
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(i) Let us first notice that the parameters α and β1 play exactly the same role for the optimal effort a⋆,
since they intervene only through their sum α + β1. Moreover, we observe that a⋆ is non–decreasing
with respect to these two parameters. Indeed, a higher increasing rate for each project value implies
that the Agents are more eager to make efforts, which will produce more benefits in the future. This
is mainly due to the fact that α and β1 play the roles of the boosters of the value of each project.
(ii) Similarly, a⋆ is increasing with respect to β2. This is more surprising, since β2 somehow measures the
gain, in terms of the associated increase of the drift of X, that the Agent gets from the efforts of the
other Agents. Hence, one could expect that the Agent may decide to work less and let the other ones
do all the work for him. Therefore, at the optimum, the Principal gives sufficiently good incentives to
the Agents so that at the equilibrium they select, they do not adopt any free–rider type behaviour. Ex
post, since the optimal efforts are deterministic and the Agents are identical, we observe that replacing
the impact on the project dynamics of one Agent effort by the average of all efforts does not modify
in any way the solution to the problem.
(iii) Notice that a⋆ decreases with the time t (or equivalently increases with the time left until maturity
(T − t), whenever α+β1 > 0. This was to be expected as the boosting effect (due to α and β1) on the
project value dynamics incentivize Agents to make more efforts at the beginning of the project and
take advantage of the benefits automatically produced in the future.
(iv) As expected, a⋆ decreases with the cost parameter c: the more costly it is for the Agent to work, the
more difficult it is going to be for the Principal to give him incentives to work.
(v) Quite surprisingly, both the volatility of the project σ, as well as the volatility penalisation, through
the parameter γ, have no impact on a⋆. This is of course an unrealistic conclusion of the model, which
is, according to us, a simple artefact of the fact that both the Principal and the Agent are risk–neutral
here. As can be inferred from the general PDEs derived in Section 4.2, this effect should generally
disappear for more general situations.
Optimal contract ξ∗
(i) The optimal contract always divides into a fixed salary δ, and a random part indexed on the perfor-
mances of the project X, corresponding to the difference between the value of the project at time T ,
and the capitalized initial value of the project with rate α + β1 (which is the rate generated by the
project itself). Whenever β1 = 0 and β2 = 0, the Principal always transfers the totality of the project
to the Agent and he does not keep any risk. This feature is classical since the Agent is risk–neutral.
Indeed the same conclusions hold in Holmström and Milgrom’s model [27].
(ii) Whenever β2 > 0 and β1 = 0, the Principal transfers to the Agents a fraction of the company, which
happens to be greater than 1, and hereby faces a random terminal gain. In order to provide proper
incentives to the Agents, the Principal accepts to face a random terminal payment which surprisingly
decreases with the value of the company, but that he can compensate via a reduction of the fixed salary
part δ. This feature disappears in the more realistic framework where each project is impacted by a
convex combination of both the effort of the representative Agent and the average efforts of all the
other ones. Mathematically this corresponds to taking β2 ∈ (0, 1) and considering the following drift
for each project:
b : (s, x, µ, q, a) 7−→ (1− β2)a+ αx+ β2
∫
R
zdqs(z)− γVµ(s).
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(iii) If β1 > 0, it is worth noticing that the optimal contract ξ⋆ is not Markovian anymore. The con-
tract is indexed on all the values of the project X over time, with a growing importance as time
approaches maturity. This effect is due to the impact of the other Agents project on the dynamics of
the representative one, and would not appear using the parameter α only.
(iv) The fixed salary δ is decreasing with respect to α, β1 and β2. Recall that these parameters have to be
seen as boosters for the project. This reduction is compensated by the more advantageous dynamics
of the project X, so that the average of the terminal payment ξ⋆ is in fact increasing with these
parameters.
(v) On the other hand, the fixed part δ of the optimal contract, as well as the average of the terminal
payment ξ⋆ increase with the variance penalization γ. The Principal increases the fixed part of the
salary in order to compensate the negative effect on the dynamics of the project of the dispersion of
the results of all the projects of the company.
Value of the game for the Principal
(i) As in the classical Principal-unique agent model, all the Agents always obtain here their reservation
utility. In our model, the interaction between the Agents does not create a situation where the Principal
should provide them with a higher utility.
(ii) Since the Principal is risk-neutral, the value of the game for him is the expectation of his terminal
gain. It is increasing with respect to the boosters α, β1, β2 of the project, and is decreasing with the
variance penalization γ, which is of course quite natural.
(iii) From the viewpoint of the Principal, it is more interesting to have project dynamics, which are boosted
through the average level of the projects, instead of the level of the project itself. The averaging effect
over the level of the different projects provide a more secure dynamics for each project of the company.
On the other hand, interchanging the boosting effect provided by the effort of the representative
Agent, with the one provided by the average effort of all Agents does not provide any extra value for
the Principal.
5.2 Extension to risk averse Principal
In all this section, we assume for the sake of simplicity that α > 0. We now investigate a model in which
the payoff of the Principal is penalised by the covariance between the project and the salary given to any
Agent. More precisely, the Principal has to solve for some positive constants λX , λξ, λXξ
UP0 (Y0) = sup
(χ,Z)∈X×Z(χ)
E
P
⋆[
XT − ξ
]
− λXVarP⋆(XT )− λξVarP⋆(ξ)− λXξVarP⋆(XT − ξ), (5.4)
where VarP⋆ denotes the variance under P⋆. We thus have the following theorem, and we refer to the
appendix for its proof,
Theorem 5.2. Let z⋆ ∈ D be the unique maximiser of
z ∈ R 7−→ h(u, z) :=
(
(1 + β2)
(
|z|
c
) 1
n−1
eκ(T−u) −
|z|
n
n−1
c
1
n−1n
− (λξ + λXξ)σ
2|z|2 + 2λXξσ
2zeα(T−u)
)
,
for any u ∈ [0, T ]. The optimal contract for the problem of the Principal is
ξ⋆ := δ˜(z⋆)− α
∫ T
0
z⋆tXtdt+
∫ T
0
z⋆t dXt.
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for some explicit constant δ˜(z⋆), depending on z⋆ and the associated optimal effort of the Agent is
a⋆u :=
(
z⋆u
c
) 1
n−1
, u ∈ [0, T ].
Except in very special cases, the maximiser of the map h above cannot be computed explicitly. The case
n = 2 is an exception, on which we now concentrate.
Particular case of quadratic cost By considering the classical quadratic cost function c(a) :=
c |a|
2
2 , c > 0 for the Agent, one gets
a⋆t =
1 + β2
c (1 + 2(λξ + λXξ)cσ2)
e(α+β1)(T−t) +
2λXξσ
2
1 + 2(λξ + λXξ)cσ2
eα(T−t)
with optimal contract
ξ⋆ = C + β1
1 + β2
1 + 2(λξ + λXξ)cσ2
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)Xtdt+
1 + β2 + 2cλXξσ
2
1 + 2(λξ + λXξ)cσ2
XT ,
where C is an explicit constant. Besides,
ξ∗ ∼ N
(
R0 +
c
2
∫ T
0
|a⋆t |
2dt ;
∫ T
0
c2σ2|a⋆t |
2dt
)
.
The sensitivities to the parameters λX , λξ, λXξ of the model are summed up in the next tabular.
λX λξ λXξ
Optimal effort of the Agent = ց ց
Expectation of ξ∗ = ց ց
Variance of ξ∗ = ց ց
Economic interpretation
(i) The optimal effort of the agent is decreasing with the penalisation of both the variance of ξ and the
one of XT − ξ. Indeed, lowering the value of the projects allows to reduce the variance of the output.
As a consequence, the optimal contract provides incentives for Agents to provide less efforts.
(ii) Focus now on the particular case where β1 = β2 = 0, corresponding to the situation where there are no
interactions between the project dynamics. If the Principal criterion is only penalized by XT − ξ, we
retrieve a similar solution as the one obtained in the previous study. Indeed, when both Principal and
Agents are risk neutral, the optimal solution without penalisation already exhibits no variance, since
the Agent keeps all the risk. Hence, it is also optimal for a Principal with mean-variance criterion.
(iii) Since the contract and the output process are Gaussian processes, whenever the optimal effort is
deterministic, considering a mean variance criterion boils down in fact to solving an exponential utility
criterion problem.
(iv) The penalisation with respect to the dispersion of the project values has absolutely no effect on the
optimal effort or the optimal contract. This is due to the fact that the variance of the output is not
impacted by a deterministic effort and hence by the optimal one. This feature should disappear in less
linear models where the optimal effort is not deterministic.
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5.3 Links with the solution of the N−players’ problem
In this section, we study the N -players model by following [23] and, through an example, we aim at
studying the behaviour of the optimal contract when N goes to +∞ in the model introduced in Section
5.1 with β2 = γ = 0. For any x ∈ CN := C([0, T ];RN ), let µN (x) ∈ P(CN ) be the empirical distribution
of x defined by
µN (x)(dz1, . . . , dzN ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi(dz
i), (5.5)
where for any y ∈ C, δy(dz) ∈ P(C) denotes the Dirac mass at y. Let A ⊂ R, we consider a drift bN in
the dynamic of the RN -valued output process XN , which is Markovian and defined for any (t, x, a) ∈
[0, T ]× RN ×AN by
bN
(
t, x, µN (x), a
)
:= a+ αx+ β1
∫
RN
wµN (dw),
which can be rewritten (see the definition of µN ) bN (t, x, µN (x), a) = a+BNx, with BN := αIN+
β1
N 1N,N .
We assume that the volatility of the output is given by the N × N−matrix Σ := σIN , σ > 0 and the
components of the initial condition ψN are independent and identically distributed such that ψN,i = ψ
in law for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. More exactly, in this model, the dynamic of the output XN is given by
XNt = ψ
N +
∫ t
0
bN
(
s,XNs , µ
N (XNs ), αs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
ΣdWN,αs , t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., (5.6)
where we defined a probability measure PαN which is equivalent to P by
dPαN
dP
:= E
(∫ T
0
Σ−1bN
(
t,XNt , µ
N (XNt ), αt
)
· dWNt
)
,
and an N−dimensional PαN−Brownian motion W
N,α by
WN,αt := W
N
t −
∫ t
0
Σ−1bN
(
s,XNs , µ
N (XNs ), αs
)
ds.
Notice that in our model, the dynamic of the ith project managed by the ith Agent is directly impacted
by both the projects of other Agents and their efforts, through their empirical distribution.
We consider that any Agent is risk neutral (UA(x) = x) and he is penalised through his effort by the
quadratic cost function c defined for any a ∈ A by c(a) := ca2/2, c > 0. Finally, we consider only terminal
payments and we assume that there is no discount factor (k = 0). Thus, according to Theorem 4.1 in
[23] or Theorem 3.1 in [40], we deduce that in this framework, the optimal effort for the Agents is given
by the N−dimensional vector aN,⋆(z) defined for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and z ∈ MN (R) by (aN,⋆(z))i = z
i,i
c .
We now define the map g˜ :MN (R) −→ RN by
g˜(z) :=
(
1
2c
∣∣z1,1∣∣2 , . . . , 1
2c
∣∣zN,N ∣∣2)⊤ .
In this case, the Hamiltonian G of the HJB equation associated with the problem of the Principal (see
[23, 40]) is defined by for any (t, x, y, px, py, γx, γy, γxy) ∈ [0, T ]× (RN )2 × (RN )2 × (MN (R))3
G(t, x, y, px, py, γx, γy, γxy)
= sup
z∈MN (R)
{
a⋆(z) · px + g˜(z) · py +
σ2
2
Tr
[
z⊤zγy
]
+ σ2Tr [zγxy]
}
+BNx · px +
σ2
2
Tr [γx] .
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Thus, HJB equation associated with the Principal problem is given by
−∂tv(t, x, y) −G(t, x, y, ∂xv, ∂yv, ∂xxv, ∂yyv, ∂xyv) = 0, (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× R
N × RN ,
v(T, x, y) = UP
(
1
N
(x− y) · 1N
)
, (x, y) ∈ RN ×RN ,
(5.7)
Since in Section 5 we actually consider a risk–neutral Principal, we decided, for the sake of simplicity
and tractability to assume in this example that,
Assumption 5.1. For the N−players’ model, the Principal is risk neutral, i.e. UP (x) = x, x ∈ R.
We search now for a smooth solution to HJB equation (5.7) of the form v(t, x, y) = f(t, x) − 1N y · 1N ,
with ∂xixjf = 0, i 6= j. Such a solution requires that f satisfies the following PDE
−∂tf −B
Nx · ∂xf −
σ2
2
Tr [∂xxf ]− sup
z∈MN (R)
{
a⋆(z) · ∂xf −
1
N
g˜(z) · 1N
}
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× RN ,
f(T, x) =
1
N
x · 1N , x ∈ R
N .
(5.8)
The optimal z is given by z⋆N := Ndiag(∂xf). Using a Cole–Hopf transformation and then Feynman–
Kac’s formula, we get an explicit smooth solution to PDE (5.8) given by
f(t, x) = e(α+β1)(T−t)
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi +
γ⋆σ2
4(α + β1)
(
e2(α+β1)(T−t) − 1
)
.
Recall now that the optimal z for the HJB equation (5.8) is given by zN,⋆t = Ndiag(∂xf
N)(t, x), (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]× RN . Hence,
zN,⋆t = exp((α + β1)(T − t))IN , (5.9)
and the value function V N of the Principal is
V N (t, x, y) = e(α+β1)(T−t)
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi +
γ⋆σ2
4(α + β1)
(
e2(α+β1)(T−t) − 1
)
−
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi. (5.10)
Remark 5.1. Notice that the component of (zN,⋆t )
i,i are identical. Thus, the optimal effort does not
depend on the Agent. This is relevant since any Agents are supposed to be identical.
We thus have from Proposition 4.1 in [23] or Theorem 3.2 in [40] together with Theorem 5.1 the following
theorem, whose the proof is postponed to the appendix,
Theorem 5.3. Assume that for any i = 1, . . . , N , (λN0 )
i = λ0. We have the following two properties.
(i) The optimal effort aN,⋆ of Agents in the N−players’ model is given by
aN,⋆t =
exp((α + β1)(T − t))
c
1N ,
In particular, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have (aN,⋆t )
i = a⋆t , i.e. the optimal effort of the ith Agent in
the N players model coincides with the optimal effort of the Agent in the mean–field model.
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(ii) The optimal contract ξN,⋆ proposed by the Principal is
ξN,⋆ := RN0 −
∫ T
0
exp(2κ(T − t))
2c
1Ndt−
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)BNX
N
t dt+
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)dXNt ,
and for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
P
aN,⋆
N ◦
(
(ξN,⋆)i
)−1 weakly
−→
N→∞
P
a⋆ ◦ (ξ⋆)−1.
Remark 5.2. In our very particular example, proving the convergence of the value functions associated
with the N−players’ model and the mean field model is direct, since we can compute explicitly all the
relevant quantities. In a more general case, and in view of the comprehensive investigation carried out
in [8] (see more precisely Theorem 2.13), one can reasonably expect to get the convergence of the value
functions of both the Principal and the Agents, and therefore the convergence of the optimal contracts (seen
as the terminal values of the continuation utilities of the Agents) of the N−players’ model to the mean
field model, when N goes to +∞. However, the convergence of the optimal efforts in the Nash equilibria
of the N−players’ model, to the equilibria in the mean field model, remains a much harder problem, since
it would necessarily involve studying the convergence of the derivatives of the value functions. We leave
these very interesting questions for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Technical proofs of Sections 2 and 3
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let (µ, q, α) ∈ P(C) ×P(R)×A. We set
vAt (χ, ξ, µ, q, α) := E
Pµ,q,α
[
KX,µ,qt,T UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
KX,µ,qt,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs))ds
∣∣∣∣Ft],
and Et,T := E
( ∫ T
t σ
−1
s (X)b(s,X, µ, qs, αs)ds
)
. First of all, by Hölder’s inequality, the definition of Ξ, A
(recall (2.2)) and Assumptions (Cp,ℓ,m,m), (K) and (U), we have that the process vA(χ, ξ, µ, q, α) belongs
to Sexp(R). Hence10, the process (Mt)t∈[0,T ] defined for any t ∈ [0, T ] by
Mt := E0,t
(
KX,µ,q0,t v
A
t (χ, ξ, µ, q, α) +
∫ t
0
KX,µ,q0,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs)) ds
)
,
is a (P,F)−martingale in E(R). We deduce that there exists an F−predictable process Z˜ ∈ Hp(R), for
any p ≥ 0, such that Mt = MT −
∫ T
t Z˜sσs(X)dWs. Applying Ito¯’s formula, we obtain
dE−1t = −E
−1
t b(t,X, µ, qt, αt)σ
−1
t (X)dWt + E
−1
t |b(t,X, µ, qt, αt)|
2σ−2t (X)dt.
Thus, d(E−1t Mt) = Ẑtσt(X)dW
µ,q,α,
t , with Ẑt := E
−1
t
(
−Mtb(t,X, µ, qt, αt)σ
−2
t (X) + Z˜t
)
. By Assump-
tions (Bp,ℓ,η) and (σ), the definition of A, Hölder’s inequality and the fact that Z˜ ∈ Hp(R) for any p ≥ 1,
we deduce that we also have Ẑ ∈ Hp(R) for any p ≥ 1.
10Notice here that we have to go back to the probability P to apply the martingale representation theorem. Indeed, as
shown in the celebrated example of Tsirelson (see Revuz and Yor [47][Chapter IX, Exercise (3.15)]), the representation may
fail under Pµ,q,α. We would like to thank Saïd Hamadène for pointing out this technical problem to us.
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Finally, applying Ito¯’s formula again and setting
Y µ,q,αt (χ, ξ) := v
A
t (χ, ξ, µ, q, α), Z
µ,q,α
t (χ, ξ) := exp
(∫ t
0
k(s,X, µ, qs)ds
)
Ẑt,
we deduce that (Y µ,q,αt (χ, ξ), Z
µ,q,α
t (χ, ξ)) is a solution to BSDE (2.5). Moreover, recalling that since
F0 is not trivial, the Blumenthal 0 − 1 law does not hold here, we cannot claim that Y
µ,q,α
0 (χ, ξ) is a
constant, and it a priori depends on the canonical process ψ. We therefore have
E[Y µ,q,α0 (χ, ξ)] =
∫
R
Y µ,q,α0 (χ, ξ)(x)λ0(dx) = v
A
0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α).
The uniqueness is a classical under Assumption (K) and (Bp,ℓ,η), since the generator is uniformly Lipschitz
in y, and linear in z, with a linearity process which is, by definition of A, sufficiently integrable, and we
refer to [21] for instance.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Under Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η), (K) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m), for any fixed (s, x, µ, q, y, z, χ) ∈
[0, T ]× C ×P(C)×P(R)×R×R×R+, we have that the map a 7−→ g(s, x, y, z, µ, q, a, χ) is continuous.
Therefore, if A is bounded, it is a compact subset of R and the existence of a bounded maximiser is
obvious.
Assume now that A is unbounded. Then, it is also clear that for any fixed (s, x, µ, q, y, z, χ) ∈ [0, T ] ×
C × P(C) × P(R) × R × R × R+ the map a 7−→ g(s, x, y, z, µ, q, a, χ) is coercive, in the sense that it
goes to −∞ as |a| goes to +∞. Therefore, the existence of a maximiser is obvious. Besides, since
neither k nor uA depend on a, then any maximiser clearly does not depend on χ and y. Let now
a⋆(s, x, z, µ, q) ∈ argmaxa∈A g(s, x, y, z, µ, q, a, χ). If it happens to belong to the boundary of A, then it
is automatically bounded. Otherwise, if this is an interior maximiser, it satisfies the first order conditions
z∂ab(s, x, µ, qs, a
⋆(s, x, z, µ, q)) = ∂ac(s, x, µ, qs, a
⋆(s, x, z, µ, q)). (A.1)
Thus, by our assumptions on the derivatives of c and b, there exists some positive constant κ such that
|a⋆(s, x, z, µ, q)|m ≤ κ|z||∂ab(s, x, µ, qs, a
⋆(s, x, z, µ, q))|
≤ κ|z|
(
1 + b1(‖x‖s,∞) +
(∫
C
‖w‖ps,∞µ(dw)
) 1
p
+
(∫
R
|w|pq(dw)
) 1
p
)
+ κ|z||a⋆(s, x, z, µ, q)|ℓ−1.
Therefore, if a⋆ is unbounded, there exists D > 0 such that
|a⋆(s, x, z, µ, q)|
≤ D|z|
1
m+1−ℓ
(
1 + |b1(‖x‖s,∞)|
1
m+1−ℓ +
(∫
C
‖w‖ps,∞µ(dw)
) 1
p(m+1−ℓ)
+
(∫
R
|w|pq(dw)
) 1
p(m+1−ℓ)
)
.
Hence the desired result for a⋆. The growth for g at a⋆(s, x, z, µ, q) is immediate from our assumptions.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [23] and based
on the so–called martingale optimality principle. We prove it in two steps.
Step 1: a solution to (MFG)(χ, ξ) provides a solution to BSDE (3.2).
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Let (µ, q, α⋆) be a solution to (MFG)(χ, ξ). Let τ ∈ T[0,T ], the set of F−stopping times valued in [0, T ].
We define the following family of random variables V Aτ (χ, ξ, µ, q) := ess sup
α∈A
vAτ (χ, ξ, µ, q, α), where
vAτ (χ, ξ, µ, q, α) = E
Pµ,q,α
[
KX,µ,qτ,T UA(ξ) +
∫ T
τ
KX,µ,qτ,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs))ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] .
From for instance Theorem 2.4 in [22] as well as the discussion in their Section 2.4.2, we recall that this
family satisfies the following dynamic programming principle
V Aτ (χ, ξ, µ, q)
= ess sup
α∈A
E
Pµ,q,α
[
KX,µ,qτ,θ Vθ(χ, ξ, µ, q) +
∫ θ
τ
KX,µ,qτ,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs))ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ,
for any θ ∈ T[0,T ] with τ ≤ θ, P− a.s. We thus notice that for any α ∈ A, the family(
KX,µ,q0,τ V
A
τ (χ, ξ, µ, q) +
∫ τ
0
KX,µ,q0,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs))ds
)
τ∈T[0,T ]
,
is a Pµ,q,α−super–martingale system which can be aggregated (see [18]) by a unique F−optional process
coinciding with
(Mαt )t∈[0,T ] :=
(
KX,µ,q0,t V
A
t (χ, ξ, µ, q) +
∫ t
0
KX,µ,q0,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs)) ds
)
t∈[0,T ]
,
which is therefore a Pµ,q,α−super–martingale for any α ∈ A.
We now check that Mα
⋆
is a Pµ,q,α
⋆
−uniformly integrable martingale. Since (µ, q, α⋆) is a solution to
(MFG)(χ, ξ), we have
V A0 (χ, ξ, µ, q) = v
A
0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α
⋆)
= EP
µ,q,α⋆
[
KX,µ,q0,T UA(ξ) +
∫ T
0
KX,µ,q0,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, α
⋆
s))ds
]
.
By the super–martingale property, we thus have
V A0 (χ, ξ, µ, q) ≥ E
Pµ,q,α
⋆ [
Mα
⋆
t
]
≥ EP
µ,q,α⋆
[
Mα
⋆
T
]
= V A0 (χ, ξ, µ, q).
Hence, Mα
⋆
t = E
Pµ,q,α
⋆ [
Mα
⋆
T
∣∣Ft] , which shows that Mα⋆ is a Pµ,q,α⋆−martingale, which is uniformly
integrable under Assumptions (Bp,ℓ,η), (σ), (K) and (Cp,ℓ,m,m). Furthermore, it is also clear thanks to
Hölder’s inequality that V A belongs to E(R), since α⋆ ∈ A. By Lemma 2.1, we deduce that there exists
some process Zµ,q,α
⋆
∈ Hλrexp(R) (recall that the solution of the mean–field game is assumed to be in
MFIr(χ, ξ)) such that
V At (χ, ξ, µ, q) = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
g
(
s,X, V As (χ, ξ, µ, q), Z
µ,q,α⋆
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, α
⋆
s, χs
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
Zµ,q,α
⋆
s (χ, ξ)σs(X)dWs.
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We thus deduce that for any α ∈ A, we have
Mαt = K
X,µ,q
0,T UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
g
(
s,X, V As (χ, ξ, µ, q), Z
µ,q,α⋆
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, α
⋆
s, χs
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
Zµ,q,α
⋆
s (χ, ξ)σs(X)dW
µ,q,α
s .
Since Mαt has to be a P
µ,q,α−super–martingale, we have necessarily for any α ∈ A
g
(
s,X, V As (χ, ξ, µ, q), Z
µ,q,α⋆
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, α
⋆
s , χs
)
≥ g
(
s,X, V As (χ, ξ, µ, q), Z
µ,q,α⋆
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, αs, χs
)
.
By setting Y ⋆(χ, ξ) := V (χ, ξ, µ, q), Z⋆(χ, ξ) := Zµ,q,α
⋆
(χ, ξ), we have finally proved that the quadruple
(Y ⋆(χ, ξ), Z⋆(χ, ξ), µ, q) is a solution to BSDE (3.2) and α⋆ ∈ AX,Z
⋆,µ,q.
Step 2: a solution to BSDE (3.2) provides a solution to (MFG)(χ, ξ).
Let now (Y ⋆(χ, ξ), Z⋆(χ, ξ), µ, q) be a solution to BSDE (3.2). Recall from Lemma 3.1 together with a
measurable selection argument that there exists a process a⋆(·,X,Z⋆(χ, ξ), µ, q·) ∈ R such that
a⋆s := a
⋆(s,X,Z⋆s (χ, ξ), µ, qs) ∈ argmax
a∈A
g(s,X, Y ⋆s (χ, ξ), Z
⋆
s (χ, ξ), µ, qs, a).
Following the computations of Step 1, we obtain that for any α ∈ A,
(M˜αt )t∈[0,T ] :=
(
KX,µ,q0,t Y
⋆
t (χ, ξ) +
∫ t
0
KX,µ,q0,s (uA(s,X, µ, qs, χs)− c(s,X, µ, qs, αs))ds
)
t∈[0,T ]
,
is a Pµ,q,α−super–martingale and a Pµ,q,a
⋆
−martingale, which is uniformly integrable since Y ⋆(χ, ξ) ∈
E(R). Remember that by Lemma 2.1 we have
vA0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, a
⋆) = EP[Y ⋆0 (χ, ξ)] = E
P
µ,q,a⋆
[Y ⋆0 (χ, ξ)],
since the only randomness in Y ⋆0 (χ, ξ) comes from the canonical process ψ, so that it does not matter
which probability measure you use in the expectation. We thus have for any α ∈ A, using Fubini’s
Theorem and the fact that M˜α0 is actually independent of α by construction
vA0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, a
⋆) = EP
µ,q,a⋆
[Y ⋆0 (χ, ξ)] = E
P
µ,q,a⋆
[
M˜a
⋆
T
]
= EP
µ,q,a⋆
[
M˜α0
]
= EP
µ,q,α
[
M˜α0
]
≥ EP
µ,q,α
[
M˜αT
]
= vA0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, α).
It therefore means that we have V A0 (χ, ξ, µ, q) = v
A
0 (χ, ξ, µ, q, a
⋆). Furthermore, we have by definition
that Pµ,q,a
⋆
◦ (X)−1 = µ and Pµ,q,a
⋆
◦ (a⋆t )
−1 = qt for Lebesgue almost every t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, it simply
remains to prove that a⋆ is indeed in A to deduce that (µ, q, a⋆) is a solution to (MFG)(χ, ξ). Recall
that Z⋆ ∈ Hλrexp(R). We then obtain for any h ≥ 1 and for some constants κ, κ˜ > 0 and by denoting r the
conjugate of r
E
[
exp
(
h
∫ T
0
|a⋆t |
ℓ+mdt
)]
≤ κE
[
exp
(
hκ˜
∫ T
0
|Z⋆t |
λ
(
1 + b1(‖X‖t,+∞)
λ
)
dt
)]
≤ κE
exp
hκ˜(∫ T
0
|Z⋆t |
λrdt
) 1
r
(∫ T
0
|b1(‖X‖t,+∞)|
λr
)
dt
 1r

≤ κE
[
exp
(
hκ˜
∫ T
0
|Z⋆t |
λrdt
)]
< +∞,
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by using Lemma 3.1, Hölder’s Inequality, Young’s Inequality and the definition of Z⋆. We now show that
a⋆ ∈ Aε˜ for some ε˜ > 0. Recall that ℓ ≤ m. Then, there exists a positive constant κ > 0 which may vary
from line to line such that for any h, k > 1 we have by Hölder’s inequality
E
[
exp
(
k
2
∫ T
0
|σ−1t (X)b(t,X, µ, qt, a
⋆
t )|
2dt
)]
≤ κE
[
exp
(
3M2k
2
∫ T
0
(
C2|a⋆t |
2ℓ + |b0(‖X‖t,∞)|
2dt
))]
≤ κE
[
exp
(
3M2C2kh
2(h− 1)
∫ T
0
|a⋆t |
2ℓdt
)]1− 1
h
E
[
exp
(
3hkM2
2
∫ T
0
|b0(‖X‖t,∞)|
2dt
)] 1
h
,
which is finite as soon as ph ≤ η.
Thus, since η > 1, we can choose k > 1, so that by Lépingle and Mémin [35][Théorème a)], we deduce
that there exists ε˜ > 0 such that
E
[(
E
(∫ T
0
σ−1t (X)b(t,X, µ, qt, a
⋆
t )dWt
))1+ε˜]
< +∞.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Let (χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ. From Theorem 3.1, there exists (Y ⋆, Z⋆, µ, q) ∈ E(S)×Hλrexp(R)×
P(C) × P(R) such that (Y ⋆, Z⋆, µ, q) is a solution to BSDE (3.2). Besides, the proof of the Step 1 of
Theorem 3.1 shows that E[Y ⋆0 ] = V
A
0 (χ, ξ, µ, q) ≥ R0. Thus, we deduce that the system (3.5) admits a
solution with parameters Y0 := E[Y ⋆0 ] and Z := Z
⋆. Thus (χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ̂.
Conversely, let (χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ̂ with ξ = U (−1)A
(
Y Y0,ZT (χ)
)
where the quadruple (Y Y0,Z(χ), Z, µ, q) is a solution
to the system (3.5) with Y0 ≥ R0 and Z ∈ Z(χ). Then, according to Theorem 3.1, we deduce that
(χ, ξ) ∈ Ξ.
A.2 Technical proofs of Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1. For the considered model, we will show that there exists a smooth solution to
HJB equation (5.3) and that the optimal z is in D. This leads us to set the following ansatz
Ansatz 1. The optimal z for the HJB equation (5.3) is in D.
Considering this ansatz, and by denoting U(t, ν) the correspond dynamic version of the problem of the
Principal with Z restricted to D, we obtain for any (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ] × P(C2)
UP (t, ν) = sup
z∈D
{∫ T
t
H(u, zu)du
}
+
∫
R
xν1(dx)eκ(T−t) −
∫
R
xν2(dx)
− γ
∫ T
t
eκ(T−u)
(
e2α(u−t)Vν1(t) +
σ2
2α
(e2α(u−t) − 1)1α>0 + σ
2(u− t)1α=0
)
du, (A.2)
where
H(u, z) := (1 + β2)
(
|z|
c
) 1
n−1
eκ(T−u) −
|z|
n
n−1
c
1
n−1n
.
Thus, z⋆u := (1 + β2)e
κ(T−u) is optimal for this sub-optimal problem. As for the corresponding value, we
need to distinguish several cases.
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• If α = β1 = 0, we get
UP (t, ν) = (T − t)
(
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
c
1
n−1
n− 1
n
)
+
∫
R
xν1(dx) −
∫
R
xν2(dx)
− γ(T − t)
(∫
R
|x|2ν1(dx) −
(∫
R
xν1(dx)
)2)
− γσ2
(T − t)2
2
.
• If α = 0 and β1 > 0, we get
UP (t, ν) =
∫ T
t
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
eβ1
n
n−1
(T−u)
c
1
n−1
(
1−
1
n
)
du+
∫
R
xν1(dx)eβ1(T−t) −
∫
R
xν2(dx)
− γ
eβ1(T−t) − 1
β1
(∫
R
|x|2ν1(dx) −
(∫
R
xν1(dx)
)2)
− γσ2
∫ T
t
eβ1(T−u)(u− t)du.
• If α > 0 and α 6= β1, we get
UP (t, ν) =
∫ T
t
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
eκ
n
n−1
(T−u)
c
1
n−1
(
1−
1
n
)
du+
∫
R
xν1(dx)eκ(T−t) −
∫
R
xν2(dx)
−
γ
2α− κ
(e2α(T−t) − eκ(T−t))
(∫
R
|x|2ν(dx)−
(∫
R
xν(dx)
)2
+
σ2
2α
)
−
γσ2
2ακ
(1− eκ(T−t)).
(A.3)
• If α > 0 and α = β1 we have
UP (t, ν) =
∫ T
t
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
eκ
n
n−1
(T−u)
c
1
n−1
(
1−
1
n
)
du+
∫
R
xν1(dx)eκ(T−t) −
∫
R
xν2(dx)
− γe2α(T−t)(T − t)
(∫
R
|x|2ν1(dx)−
(∫
R
xν1(dx)
)2
+
σ2
2α
)
−
γσ2
4α2κ
(1− e2α(T−t)).
We only prove the result when α 6= β1 and α, β1 > 0 since the other cases can be obtained similarly.
The proof is divided in three steps. In the first one, we show that UP (t, ν) is a smooth solution to the
HJB equation (5.3). In the second step, we provide a verification theorem by adapting the proof of [44,
Theorem 4.1], and in the last step we compute explicitly the optimal contract ξ⋆.
Step 1: a smooth solution to the HJB equation (5.3). Direct computations show that for any
z ∈ Z˜p∫
R
L
z
tU
P (t, ν)(x)ν(dx)
=
∫
R
((
|z(t, x, ν)|
c
) 1
n−1
(1 + β2)e
κ(T−t) −
(
|z(t, x, ν)|n
cnn−1
) 1
n−1
)
ν(dx) + κ
∫
R
xν1(dx)eκ(T−t)
−
(
2
γα
2α − κ
(e2α(T−t) − eκ(T−t)) + γeκ(T−t)
)(∫
R
|x|2ν1(dx)−
(∫
R
xν1(dx)
)2)
−
γσ2
2α − κ
(e2α(T−t) − eκ(T−t)).
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Notice that for any (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 × P(C2), the maximum of
z ∈ Z˜p 7−→
(
|z(t, x, ν)|
c
) 1
n−1
(1 + β2)e
κ(T−t) −
(
|z(t, x, ν)|n
cnn−1
) 1
n−1
is clearly z⋆t := (1 + β2)e
κ(T−t). Thus, we have
sup
z∈Z˜p
{∫
R2
((
|z(t, x, ν)|
c
) 1
n−1
(1 + β2)e
κ(T−t) −
(
|z(t, x, ν)|n
cnn−1
) 1
n−1
)
ν(dx)
}
= (1 + β2)
n
n−1
eκ
n
n−1
(T−t)
c
1
n−1
(
1−
1
n
)
.
Thus, the HJB Equation (5.3) is satisfied by UP .
Step 2: Verification result. Using the fact that UP solves (5.3), we thus get from the verification
Theorem 4.2 that z⋆t := (1+β2)e
κ(T−t) is a maximiser for the HJB equation (5.3) in D, then in Z˜p. Thus,
we deduce that UP0 = U
P
0 , so that the Ansatz holds, with the optimal control z
⋆
t := (1 + β2)e
κ(T−t), t ∈
[0, T ].
Step 3: computation of the optimal contract and admissibility. Notice that the optimal effort
of the Agent is a⋆u := a
⋆
u(z
⋆) = (1 + β2)
1
n−1
(
e(α+β1)(T−u)
c
) 1
n−1 . By remembering the discussion of Section
4.2.3, their exists a solution (X,Y R0,z
⋆
, µ⋆, q⋆) to the system 3.5 and according to Corollary 3.1, (µ⋆, q⋆, a⋆)
is a solution to (MFG)(ξ⋆) in MFr(ξ⋆) for any r > 1 with ξ⋆ = Y R0,z
⋆
T .
Denote now P⋆ := Pµ
⋆,q⋆,a⋆ and W ⋆ := W µ
⋆,q⋆,a⋆ . Let t ∈ [0, T ], we set
f(t) := E⋆[Xt], g(t) := E
⋆
[
|Xt|
2
]
, zn(t) :=
(
|z⋆t |
c
) 1
n−1
, for any t ∈ [0, T ], Z ∈ C.
Thus, applying Ito¯’s formula, we obtain the following system of ODEs for any 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T
f ′(t) = (1 + β2)zn(t) + (α+ β1)f(t)− γg(t) + γ|f(t)|
2, f(0) =
∫
R
xλ0(dx),
g′(t) = 2αg(t) + 2f(t)(f ′(t)− αf(t)) + σ2, g(0) =
∫
R
x2λ0(dx).
(A.4)
(A.5)
Using (A.5) we have
g(t) =
(
g(0) − f2(0)
)
e2αt + f2(t) +
σ2
2α
(e2αt − 1).
The ODE (A.4) thus become for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T
f ′(t) = κf(t) +Hn(t), f(0) =
∫
R
xλ0(dx), (A.6)
with Hn(t) := (1 + β2)zn(t) − γ σ
2
2α (e
2αt − 1) − γ
(
g(0) − f2(0)
)
e2αt. Thus, the linear ODE (A.6) has a
unique solution given by
f(t) =
∫
R
xλ0(dx)e
κt +
∫ t
0
eκ(t−u)Hn(u)du = λ1e
κt + λ2e
− κ
n−1
t + λ3e
2αt + λ4,
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with
λ1 :=
∫
R
xλ0(dx) + (1 + β2)
(
(1 + β2)e
κT
c
) 1
n−1 n− 1
κn
+
γσ2
κ(2α− κ)
+
γ
2α− κ
(
g(0) − f2(0)
)
,
λ2 := −(1 + β2)
(
(1 + β2)e
κT
c
) 1
n−1 n− 1
κn
, λ3 := −
γσ2
2α(2α − κ)
−
γ
(
g(0) − f2(0)
)
2α− κ
, λ4 := −
γσ2
2ακ
.
Thus, the optimal contract is given, after tedious but simple computations
ξ⋆ = δ − α(1 + β2)
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)Xtdt+ (1 + β2)
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)dXt,
with
δ := R0 −
(
1 + β2 −
1
n
)
(1 + β2)
n
n−1
n(α+ β1)c
1
n−1
(
e(α+β1)
n
n−1
T − 1
)
− (1 + β2)e
(α+β1)T
[
Tβ1
(
f(0) +
γσ2
(α+ β1)(α − β1)
+
γVλ0
α− β1
)
+
1
2
γσ2
(
1− e−(α+β1)T
)
(α+ β1)2
−
γα
(
σ2
2α + Vλ0
)
(α− β1)2
(
e(α−β1)T − 1
)
+
(1 + β2)(n − 1)β1
nc
1
n−1 (α+ β1)
e
α+β1
n−1
T
(
T −
n− 1
n(α+ β1)
(
1− e−
n
n−1
(α+β1)T
))]
.
(A.7)
Proof of Theorem 5.2. First notice that since h is clearly coercive in z, there exists at least z⋆ ∈ D
maximising h. After tedious but easy computations, we prove that the uniqueness of the maximizer in
D of h holds. Following the proof of Theorem 5.1, the corresponding HJB equation is
− ∂tv(t, ν)− sup
z∈Z˜p
(∫
R
L
z
t v(t, ν)(x)ν(dx)
)
= 0
v(T, ν) =
∫
R2
(x− y)ν(dx, dy) + 2λXξ
(∫
R2
xyν(dx, dy)−
∫
R
xν1(dx)
∫
R
yν2(dy)
)
− (λX + λXξ)
(∫
R
|x|2ν1(dx)−
(∫
R
xν1(dx)
)2)
− (λξ + λXξ)
(∫
R
|y|2ν2(dy)−
(∫
R
yν2(dy)
)2)
.
(A.8)
As previously, by considering the Ansatz 1, and by denoting U(t, ν) the dynamic version of the problem
the Principal restricted to deterministic Z, we can compute explicitly U(t, ν) for any (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×P(C2).
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we show that HJB Equation (A.8) is satisfied by UP . By adapting
the second step of the proof of Theorem 5.1, we deduce that UP is the value function of the Principal
with the optimal control z⋆ ∈ D maximising h.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. From (5.9), we deduce that (i) holds. We now turn to the proof of (ii). First
recall that
dXNt =
(
aN,⋆t +BNX
N
t
)
dt+ σdWN,⋆t , X
N
0 = ψ
N .
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Thus, by denoting SNt :=
∑N
i=1X
N,i
t for any t ∈ [0, T ] we have for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
dXN,it =
(
exp((α + β1)(T − t))
c
+ αXN,it +
β1
N
SNt
)
dt+ σd(WN,a
N,⋆
t )
i.
Notice now that
d
(
SNt
N
)
=
(
exp((α + β1)(T − t))
c
+ (α+ β1)
SNt
N
)
dt+ σ
1NdW
N,aN,⋆
t
N
.
Then, since S
N
N is an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, we get
SNt
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
ψN,ieκt +
1
2κc
(
eκ(T+t) − eκ(T−t)
)
+
∫ t
0
σe−(α+β1)(s−t)
1N
N
· dWN,a
N,⋆
s .
Hence, using the stochastic Fubini’s theorem, we get
XN,it = ψ
N,i +
∫ t
0
(αXN,is + θ
N
s )ds+
∫ t
0
σNs · dW
N,aN,⋆
s ,
where for any t ∈ [0, T ]
θNt :=
exp(κ(T − t))
c
+ β1
1
N
N∑
i=1
ψN,ieκt +
β1
2κc
(
eκ(T+t) − eκ(T−t)
)
, σNt =
σ
κ
(1− e−κ(s−t))
1N
N
+ σei.
Therefore, XN,i is an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with parameters α, θNt and volatility σ
N
t . By setting
θ⋆ := exp(κ(T−t))c + f(t) where f(t) denotes the solution to ODE (A.6), we deduce that the following
convergences hold
λ0 ◦ (θ
N
t )
−1 weakly−→
N→+∞
λ0 ◦ (θ
⋆
t )
−1,
and
P
aN,⋆
N ◦
(∫ ·
0
σNs · dW
N,⋆
s
)−1
weakly
−→
N→+∞
P
a⋆ ◦
(∫ ·
0
σdW ⋆s
)−1
.
It is then clear that the required convergence for XN,i holds. The fact that ξN,⋆ is optimal for the
N–players’ model is a direct consequence of [23, 40]. Notice that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
(ξN,⋆)i = R0 −
∫ T
0
exp(2κ(T − t))
2c
dt−
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)
(
αXN,it + β1
1
N
N∑
i=1
XN,it
)
dt+
∫ T
0
eκ(T−t)dXN,it .
By the above computations, it is clear that for any t ∈ [0, T ], the law of N−1SNt under P
aN,⋆
N converges
weakly to a Dirac mass at E⋆[X⋆t ]. Hence the desired result (ii).
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